Perceived Deservingness and the Toleration of Human Rights Violations: The Problem and a Possible Solution by Drolet, Caroline
 
Perceived Deservingness and the Toleration of Human Rights Violations:  
The Problem and a Possible Solution 
 
 
 
Caroline E. Drolet 
 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
Faculty of Social Sciences, Brock University  
St. Catharines, Ontario 
 
 
© 2014 
 ii 
Abstract 
Despite general endorsement of universal human rights, people continue to tolerate 
specific human rights violations.  I conducted a two-part study to investigate this issue.  
For Part I, I examined whether people tolerated torture (a human rights violation) based 
on the morality and deservingness of the target.  Participants tolerated torture more when 
the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression.  This effect was 
mediated by the target’s perceived deservingness for harsh treatment, and held over and 
above participants’ abstract support for the right to humane treatment.  For Part II, 
hypocrisy induction was used in an attempt to reduce participants’ toleration of the 
torture.  Participants were assigned to either the hypocrisy induction or control condition.  
Unexpectedly, participants who tolerated the torture more in Part I reduced their 
toleration the most in the control condition, possibly because of consistency and floor 
effects.  Limitations and implications of the findings are discussed. 
 Keywords: deservingness, torture, human rights, hypocrisy, cognitive dissonance 
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Perceived Deservingness and the Toleration of Human Rights Violations:  
The Problem and a Possible Solution 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was originally drafted in 
response to the atrocities that took place during the Holocaust:  It was meant to prevent 
those acts and others like them from occurring in the future (United Nations, 2014a).  The 
UDHR outlines those rights that are seen as fundamental and to which all humans are 
entitled.  The rights are fundamental in that they are granted to all people simply because 
they are human, and are not additional privileges that are determined by government 
officials or based on the region in which people live.  The rights are universal in that they 
are guaranteed to literally everyone, regardless of characteristics of individuals, such as 
race, sex, and so on.  The declaration is now used as a standard for international law 
(Pederson, 2009).  However, despite its importance, what the UDHR lays out might not 
be consistent with how people actually react to relevant situations.  Specifically, although 
these rights are deemed universal, there are situations in which human rights violations 
are tolerated (e.g., Taylor, 2013).  Moreover, a disconnect may exist between individuals’ 
expressed support for human rights and their toleration of violations of those rights in 
specific situations or contexts.   
 The first goal of my thesis was to look at one factor that might help explain the 
toleration of specific human rights violations as well as help account for the discrepancy 
between acceptance of universal human rights and the toleration of violations of those 
rights in specific situations.  The factor on which I focused was the perceived 
deservingness of specific targets for human rights abuses.  The second goal of my thesis 
was to look at whether or not toleration for rights violations in specific situations could 
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be decreased by highlighting the inconsistency between individuals’ toleration and their 
abstract support for the human rights being violated.   
 I will first review previous research showing an inconsistency between the 
position people endorse in an abstract sense and their reactions in specific situations, 
including situations involving human rights.  After establishing that people do tend to 
display inconsistencies between their abstract attitudes and their responses to specific 
situations, I provide evidence for the idea that individuals have a need to see that people 
get what they deserve.  Then I discuss how the need to see that people get what they 
deserve might contribute to the toleration of human rights violations and how this could 
help explain the discrepancy between supporting human rights in the abstract and 
tolerating violations of those rights in specific situations.  Finally, I explain the method I 
used for reducing this discrepancy, known as “hypocrisy induction.”   
 Although previous studies have established that people are willing to tolerate or 
even support treatment that violates human rights (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009) even 
though they might support these universal human rights in the abstract (Staerklé & 
Clémence, 2004), no research has directly looked into the role that deservingness plays in 
the toleration of human rights violations.  Moreover, no research has been conducted on 
whether or not hypocrisy induction can be used to help encourage people to act in support 
of human rights.  Rather, hypocrisy induction has mainly been used to promote positive 
health behaviour (e.g., Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 
1997) and to encourage environmentally friendly practices (e.g., Kantola, Syme, & 
Campbell, 1984).  The study that I present adds to the current literature by filling these 
gaps. 
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Part I: The Problem 
Abstract Versus Specific Responses 
 There are several researchers who have looked at situations where people support 
a position in the abstract, but act in a way that is inconsistent with their abstract position 
when dealing with a specific situation or context.  Each of these examples shows how 
abstract judgements fail to take the influence of situational factors into account.  That is, 
by failing to realize what influences their responses in specific situations, people can 
express general support for an abstract position while responding to specific situations in 
a way that contradicts that position.  
 Batson’s theorizing on moral behaviour (Batson & Thompson, 2001; Batson, 
Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999) illustrates one type of discrepancy 
between abstract ideals and behaviour in specific situations.  According to Batson, people 
might behave in a way that is inconsistent with their abstract moral standards.  One 
reason for this discrepancy is that people’s moral integrity (their motivation to act 
morally) is overpowered by situational factors that cause them to disengage from their 
standards (see Batson & Thompson, 2001; Batson et al., 1999).  Known as “overpowered 
integrity,” this form of hypocritical behaviour occurs without the actor’s full awareness.  
Batson and colleagues (1999) explain that, in such cases, individuals’ moral intentions 
are disconnected from their behaviour, so they do not associate their actions in those 
situations with their moral principles.  One factor that contributes to overpowering 
individuals’ moral integrity is the abstractness of moral principles.  These principles tend 
to be overly general and do not take into account how people selectively apply these 
principles on the basis of characteristics of specific situations (Batson & Thompson, 
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2001; for related ideas see “moral exclusion” [Staub, 1990] or “moral disengagement” 
[Bandura, 1991]).  This disconnect allows people to continue looking and feeling like 
they are moral, despite behaving in a way that is immoral (Batson et al., 1999).  Although 
this explanation was originally applied to moral motivations, it could also explain 
discrepancies between abstract opinions and situation-specific behaviour in other realms.   
 The literature on psychology and the law contains further examples of 
circumstances in which people’s abstract principles are at odds with how they respond to 
specific situations.  People often express support for certain laws, yet still respond to 
individual cases in ways that contradict those same laws (Finkel, 2001).  Characteristics 
of specific cases, such as suffering of victims or alleged perpetrators, can lead people to 
form opinions about the case that are inconsistent with the legal principles that they 
would otherwise support.  According to Finkel (2001), when people are asked about their 
general support for a given law, they tend not to take into account how they will be 
affected by this case-specific information.  Rather, they determine their sentiment toward 
a given law based on whatever exemplar is most readily available, which could be overly 
general or not representative of typical cases.  For example, in research by Finkel (2001) 
on right-to-die, people’s rulings over removing life support systems were affected by 
whether or not the patient was terminally ill and the extent to which the patient was in 
pain.  Importantly, people responded in this way despite pre-existing support for the 
abstract, legal definition of the right-to-die.  Much like the situational pressures that 
overpowered people’s abstract moral principles in Batson and colleagues’ studies, Finkel 
(2001) noted that the characteristics of individual cases overwhelm people’s support for 
abstract legal principles.   
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 Research on motivations behind punishment provides another example of a 
context in which individuals’ responses to specific situations are inconsistent with their 
abstract principles.  When asked about their motives for punishment, people tend to 
indicate a combination of two motives: deterrence (punishing offenders in order to deter 
others from committing crimes in the future) and retribution or “just-deserts” (a desire to 
punish offenders in proportion to the harm done so they receive their “just-deserts”; see 
Darley & Pittman, 2003).  However, when faced with specific cases, they actually tend to 
assign punishment in a way that is more consistent with retributive motives (Carlsmith, 
2008; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002).  That is, although people in part favour a 
deterrence approach to justice in an abstract sense, they respond according to retributive 
principles when presented with specific instances of injustice.  One possible reason for 
this discrepancy is that the initial retributive motivation to punish may come from an 
automatic or intuitive response to an observed transgression (see Darley, 2009).  Because 
these retributive motives are automatic, people may not be fully aware of the effect these 
motives have on their judgements.  If people are not aware of what will motivate them in 
specific cases, then they will not take those factors into account when determining 
whether or not they support something in the abstract.  
 In relation to human rights in particular, Staerklé and Clémence (2004) argued 
that, even for people who endorse human rights in the abstract, toleration of the violation 
of those rights often depends on factors that are relevant to the specific context or 
situation.  Two of these factors are the perceived acceptability of the victim’s behaviour 
and whether or not the violation is framed in a way that highlights the connection 
between the specific violation and one’s abstract support for the human rights being 
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violated:  In the case of Staerklé & Clémence (2004), the framing manipulation was 
whether the violation is framed as a news story or as a story about a human rights 
violation.  People presumably do not take into account the possible influence of these 
contextual factors when giving their abstract attitudes toward the human rights being 
violated.  Across two studies, Staerklé and Clémence (2004) found mixed support for this 
reasoning.  In both studies, as expected, participants generally supported certain human 
rights, but these attitudes were not necessarily consistent with their responses to specific 
violations of these human rights.  In the first study, Staerklé and Clémence attempted to 
manipulate the contextual factors of the acceptability of the target’s behaviour (e.g., in 
one case, the target of the human rights violation had either shoplifted or trafficked 
drugs) and whether the story was framed as explicitly rights-oriented or simply as a news 
story.  Unfortunately, the first manipulation was largely unsuccessful.  With regards to 
the second manipulation, participants tended to be more tolerant of the violation when it 
was framed as rights-oriented versus a news story, but the underlying mechanisms behind 
this effect were not tested and, therefore, remain unclear.  Despite the study’s limitations, 
results did show that toleration of human rights violations varied as a function of the 
behaviour of the target portrayed, regardless of participants’ abstract support for the 
relevant right.  In the second study, the behaviour of the target of the human rights 
violation was not manipulated but the results did indicate that the more unacceptable the 
target’s behaviour, the more willing participants were to tolerate the human rights 
violation.  Thus, although the mechanism is not entirely clear, Staerklé and Clémence 
offer evidence that, even within the realm of human rights, abstract attitudes can be 
overpowered by situation-specific factors. 
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 In the previous paragraphs, I presented several examples of a discrepancy between 
people’s abstract attitudes and their responses to relevant situations.  In each case, it 
seems that abstract attitudes or standards fail to take the influence of situational factors 
into account.  This failure to take into account the influence of situational factors when 
forming abstract attitudes is consistent with construal level theory, or CLT (see Trope & 
Liberman, 2010).  The basic argument posed by CLT is that there is a bidirectional 
relationship between distance and construal level: distant objects are construed at a higher 
level and, likewise, higher-level construal primes people to think of more distant objects 
(see Trope & Liberman, 2010).  When dealing with an abstract or psychologically distant 
issue, people will construe the issue at a higher level.  As such, their evaluations will be 
more reflective of the person’s general ideology or attitude.  However, when the issue is 
psychologically near—as in the case of concrete examples—construal will be at a lower 
level.  As such, evaluations will be more sensitive to contextual and situational factors 
rather than the individual’s general attitude (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  Additionally, 
when construing situations at a higher level, people tend to focus more on abstract 
principles rather than concrete, situational factors (Agerström, Björklund, & Carlsson, 
2013).  This relation between psychological distance and construal level could help 
explain situations where people express support for an abstract attitude, but respond to 
some situations in a way that is inconsistent with that position.  The evidence from 
studies on CLT indicates that abstract attitudes and responses to specific situations are 
construed at different levels and, therefore, are not influenced by the same factors (Trope 
& Liberman, 2010).  Thus, it makes sense that abstract attitudes and responses to specific 
situations would at times be discrepant.    
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 Summary.  In summary, there are several areas of research that show how 
people’s abstract attitudes can be discrepant from their responses to specific situations.  
One general explanation of these discrepancies is that, when people report their abstract 
attitudes, they fail to take into account how situational pressures will influence their 
responses in specific contexts.  Situational pressures can arise from a number of sources.  
Most relevant to the present thesis, when people report their abstract opinions, they might 
fail to account for how other underlying motivations and needs influence them in specific 
situations.  Similar to Hafer (2011), I propose that a need to see that people get what they 
deserve contributes to the toleration of human rights violations in specific situations, such 
that people tolerate human rights violations to the extent that targets of these violations 
are seen to deserve negative treatment.  Furthermore, I propose that the need to see that 
people get what they deserve (and, therefore, the degree to which individuals are seen to 
deserve negative treatment) is a factor that can help account for the discrepancy between 
toleration of human rights violations and the endorsement of these universal human rights 
in the abstract.  Before explaining my rationale in detail, in the following section I review 
evidence that people are strongly motivated to see that people get what they deserve. 
Evidence that People Need to See that Individuals Get What They Deserve 
 There are several theories and areas of research that suggest that people have a 
need to see that they and others get what they deserve; these include equity theory, just-
world theory, and research on retributive motivation for punishment.  In the next few 
paragraphs, I describe each of these perspectives on deservingness motives. 
 Equity theory.  Equity theorists claim that people are not simply concerned with 
whether or not their outcomes are favourable, so much as whether those outcomes are fair 
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and deserved (Adams, 1965).  According to equity theory, fairness and deservingness are 
defined in terms of “equity”:  People will perceive their outcomes as equitable, and thus 
fair and deserved, when the proportion of their outcome to their input is equal to the 
proportion of relevant others’ outcome to input (i.e., OutcomeA/InputA = 
OutcomeB/InputB; Adams, 1965).  Relevant others are similar others or others who are 
involved in the same exchange.  For instance, an individual who perceives a co-worker as 
getting more from a company for the same amount of work would experience a state of 
inequity, whereas an individual who perceives a co-worker as getting the same from a 
company for the same amount of work would experience a state of equity. 
 Equity theorists propose that inequitable relationships result in an amount of 
distress that is proportional to the amount of inequity being experienced and that those 
who experience inequity will try to eliminate the resulting distress by restoring equity 
(Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973).  If the perceiver cannot restore 
actual equity to the relationship, then she or he can restore psychological equity by 
distorting his or her perception of the relationship.  Interestingly, this model holds up 
even when the inequitable relationship is one where the perceiver is getting more than is 
equitable or deserved (Skitka, Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003; Walster et al., 1973).  
When this is the case, people might give up their own resources in order to restore equity 
to the relationship (i.e., make sure that they are not getting more than they actually 
deserve).  Thus, the motivation to see that people get what is deserved can override 
immediate self-interest. 
 The adherence to equity norms, at the cost of satisfying immediate self-interest, is 
thought to be the result of a belief that people can maximize their outcomes in the long 
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run if they and their group act equitably compared to if everyone were to act without 
regard for anyone else (Walster et al., 1973).  In this way, a major assumption underlying 
equity theory is that humans are primarily selfish:  People behave equitably because they 
believe it will allow them to maximize their outcomes in the long term.  Through this co-
operative system where those who adhere to equity norms are rewarded and those who 
violate them are punished, everyone in the group collectively benefits from acting 
equitably, allowing one’s own long-term outcomes to be enhanced.  Thus, equity 
theorists view the need to see that others get what they deserve as rooted in self-interest.  
This interest in getting what is deserved in terms of equity has been observed in both 
humans and non-human species (Brosnan, 2006; Brosnan & DeWaal, 2003).  
 In summary, equity theory provides one explanation for why people need to see 
that they and others get what they deserve.  By making relationships and exchanges 
equitable (i.e., based on what parties in the relationship deserve), people are able to 
maximize their outcomes in the long run. 
 Just-world theory.  Another perspective on the need to see that people get what 
they deserve comes from just-world theory.  According to this view, people are motivated 
to see that they and others get what is deserved in order to maintain the belief that the 
world is a just place.  A just world, according to this theory, is one in which people get 
what they deserve based on their character or behaviour (e.g., good people receive good 
outcomes, bad people receive bad outcomes).  Lerner (1980) referred to this belief as the 
“fundamental delusion.”  
 According to Lerner and colleagues (Lerner, 1977; Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 
1976), the concern with deservingness starts when children learn to delay immediate 
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gratification in favour of investing in long-term goals (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 
1989).  In order to pass up a short-term reward in favour of a supposedly greater long-
term reward, people need to have some security that their investment will actually pay off 
and be more worthwhile than immediate rewards.  If they cannot be confident that their 
efforts will pay off, then people are less likely to invest in the long-term goal.  Thus, 
people develop a need to believe that the world is a just place where everyone gets what 
they deserve. 
 The belief in a just world serves a number of important functions.  First, as 
already implied, the belief in a just world allows people to set long-term goals.  If people 
are able to believe that, so long as they are good and work hard, they can achieve their 
desired goals, then investing time and effort into long-term goals becomes a reasonable 
option.  A number of studies show evidence of this function (Callan, Shead, & Olson, 
2009; Hafer, 2000; Hafer, Bègue, Choma, & Dempsey, 2005).  More generally, if people 
believe that they will get what they deserve in life, assuming they also believe that they 
deserve positive outcomes, then they can assume that victimization and other aversive 
outcomes are avoidable and unlikely to happen to them (Higgins, St. Amand, & Poole, 
1997; Sutton et al., 2008).  Furthermore, a belief in a just world is thought to give people 
a sense of meaning because it provides a framework for understanding life events 
(Dalbert, 2001). 
 Because the belief in a just world serves these important functions, when people 
observe an injustice, they are motivated to correct the situation so the belief in a just 
world can be maintained.  This can be done through methods such as compensating the 
victim, punishing the offender, or changing one’s perceptions of the event (Hafer & 
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Gosse, 2010; Lerner, 1980).  In some situations, this can mean altering perceptions of the 
victim of the injustice, as in focusing on negative characteristics of a victim that make it 
seem like she or he deserved victimization (Giacopassi & Wilkinson, 1985; Lerner & 
Simmons, 1966).  Thus, although there are obvious advantages to believing that the world 
is just, the need to believe in a just world can also lead people to reach flawed 
conclusions.   
 In summary, theory and research on the belief in a just world suggests that people 
need to see that individuals get what they deserve because they are motivated to maintain 
a belief that the world is just.  Without such a belief, people are less confident that their 
long-term investments will pay-off, are not as able to believe that they can avoid negative 
outcomes, and lack a sense of meaning in life. 
 Retributive motivation for punishment.  Research on laypeople’s motives for 
punishment provides further evidence that people have a strong need to see that 
individuals get what they deserve.  As already noted in the section on abstract versus 
specific responses, research shows that people are motivated to see that wrongdoers get 
their “just deserts” when it comes to punishment, also known as a retributive motive.  
The fair and deserved punishment is one that is proportionate to the moral 
reprehensibility of the transgression (Darley, 2009).  Thus, factors that affect the degree 
of punishment desired would be those that influence the perceived moral reprehensibility 
of the crime.  For example, the more the transgressor intended to commit the crime or to 
cause harm (Carlsmith, 2006; Vidmar, 2000), and the more harm done by the offense 
(Vidmar, 2000), the greater the punishment that the transgressor is believed to deserve 
and, in turn, the more severe the punishment that is recommended for the transgressor.  
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The effect of these factors is mediated by the amount of moral outrage caused by the 
transgression (Carlsmith et al., 2002).   
 Researchers have proposed that the just-deserts motive is at least somewhat 
intuitive and universal (Darley, 2009).  As evidence for this claim, neural imaging studies 
indicate that people experience rewarding brain states when they see a transgressor who 
has committed a serious offense being punished in proportion to the crime:  People 
actually feel satisfied when they see a transgressor get his or her “just deserts” (see 
Darley, 2009).  In addition, some authors suggest an evolutionary basis for the just-
deserts motive (e.g., Robinson, Kurzban, & Jones, 2007).  The motive likely provided 
various advantages in humans’ ancestral past, such as stability and predictability, and 
facilitation of cooperative or mutually beneficial exchanges (Robinson et al., 2007).  
These neurological and evolutionary explanations support the notion that the retribution 
motive is universal and intuitive.  
 In summary, similar to both equity theory and just-world theory, theory and 
research on retributive motivation for punishment suggest that people are concerned with 
ensuring that everyone gets what is deserved.  People are driven by moral outrage to see 
that offenders get their just deserts, receiving a punishment that is proportional to their 
offense.  This need to see that people get the punishment that they deserve is thought to 
be universal and intuitive, perhaps with an evolutionary basis. 
 Summary.  In this section I reviewed several perspectives on the need to see that 
people get what they deserve.  The theories differ in their assumptions and implications 
about the nature and origins of this need.  The need to see that people get what is 
deserved can be seen as rooted in self-interest, a desire to maintain a belief in a just 
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world, and/or evolutionary mechanisms.  Despite these varying perspectives, the theories 
all converge on the notion that people’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviours in social 
situations will often be guided by what they believe individuals deserve. 
Deservingness and Human Rights 
 In this section, I tie together the research on abstract versus specific responses and 
the need to see that people get what they deserve to argue the following.  First, I argue 
that deservingness considerations are a contextual factor behind the toleration of specific 
human rights violations.  Specifically, given the research suggesting a need to see that 
people get what they deserve, I expect people to tolerate specific human rights violations 
to the extent that the target is seen to deserve the treatment that violated the human right.  
Second, given research and theory suggesting that people do not take into account 
contextual factors (e.g., perceived deservingness of specific individuals) in forming 
abstract opinions, I expect many people to support universal human rights in the abstract, 
yet still to tolerate violations of those same rights in cases where the target was perceived 
to be deserving of treatment that violated a human right.  I will discuss research relevant 
to each of the two parts of my argument in turn. 
 Deservingness and the toleration of human rights violations.  Previous 
research indirectly supports the idea that perceived deservingness of specific individuals 
influences willingness to tolerate the violations of those individuals’ human rights.  These 
studies have noted that factors such as the perceived negative valence of the target’s 
behaviour or character, including dehumanization of the target (e.g., believing that the 
target is like a wild animal because he or she committed a murder), can lead people to 
tolerate the violation of the target’s rights (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; Liberman, 
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2013; Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013).  According to Feather (1999, 2003) and others 
(e.g., Lerner, 1980), a precursor to perceived deservingness for negative outcomes (as in 
the case of a human rights violation) is that the individual is seen as having engaged in 
negative behaviour or as possessing negative characteristics.  Thus, the aforementioned 
factors might have their effect on toleration of human rights violations through 
perceptions that the target deserves the treatment that violates his or her human rights.  
For example, if the target has committed some prior bad act, his or her behaviour will be 
viewed negatively.  Note that research on the fundamental attribution error indicates that 
people often attribute the negative actions of others to their negative character (Ross, 
1977); therefore, this individual will likely also be seen as possessing negative character.  
The negative evaluations of the individual’s behaviour and character would lead people 
to believe that she or he deserves to be treated harshly; thus, people might tolerate 
treatment that violates the target’s rights (e.g., the right to humane treatment).  Given the 
evidence for a strong need to see that people get what they deserve, such a deservingness-
mediated effect would not be surprising.  However, the studies mentioned above do not 
test this account directly. 
 One example of research suggesting a link between perceived deservingness and 
toleration of human rights violations is that on retributive motivation and the treatment of 
suspected offenders.  Researchers argue that the use of harsh interrogation techniques, 
including those that violate human rights (i.e., torture), tends to be associated with the 
desire to punish suspects for their past immoral behaviour or immoral character 
(Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; Liberman, 2013).  Thus, although the techniques are often 
implemented under the guise of national security (i.e., the person needed to be tortured in 
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order to get the necessary information to avoid an attack) it appears that this is not the 
primary motivation.  Carlsmith and Sood (2009), for example, found that people 
supported harsher interrogation techniques, including torture, based on the perceived 
morality of the suspect as suggested by his past activities.  People also supported harsher 
punishment of the suspect for the same reason.  Presumably, retributive punishment 
motives influenced the decision to use harsh interrogation techniques, such that cruel and 
inhumane treatment was acceptable when the suspect was seen as deserving of such 
treatment as punishment for prior misdeeds.  The results of the study by Carlsmith and 
Sood (2009) are consistent with Liberman (2013), who found that people’s endorsement 
of the use of torture was related to their overall tendency to seek retribution for past 
offenses.  Those who strongly endorsed retributive punishments also tended to support 
harsh punishment of transgressor states and the harsh treatment of detainees (Liberman, 
2013).  Neither Carlsmith and Sood (2009) nor Liberman (2013), however, assessed 
perceived deservingness. 
 Research on dehumanization also suggests a link between perceived 
deservingness and toleration of human rights violations.  Dehumanization occurs in 
different forms, one of which is to deny that certain individuals or groups possess 
uniquely human qualities (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Haslam, 
2006; Leyens, Désert, Croizet, & Darcis, 2000).  Viki et al. (2013) found that people 
were more willing to torture the individuals and group that they dehumanized, compared 
to those that they did not.  Groups or individuals that are dehumanized tend to be seen as 
more blameworthy and immoral (Bastian et al., 2011), likely leading to the evaluation 
that they deserve to be punished or mistreated.  The dehumanization studies suggest, 
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therefore, that people will support torture (a violation of an individual’s human rights) 
due to a desire to punish suspects in accordance with what they are seen to deserve (e.g., 
because of their immoral character or behaviour).  Again, however, perceived 
deservingness was not assessed. 
In summary, previous research indirectly supports the idea that perceived 
deservingness of the targets of human rights violations influences people’s willingness to 
tolerate those violations.  In the current study, I looked directly at the role of perceived 
deservingness in the toleration of a human rights violation. 
 Deservingness and abstract versus specific support for human rights.  For the 
first part of my thesis, I also examined whether people showed a discrepancy between 
their abstract support for a given human right and their willingness to tolerate specific 
violations of that human right, as well as whether this was due to deservingness concerns.  
The distinction of who deserves good or bad treatment is antithetical to what it means for 
human rights to be universal (see Hafer, 2011).  Universal human rights are those that 
people cannot be denied based on any differentiating characteristics, including those that 
influence their perceived deservingness for good or bad treatment.  Thus, if individuals 
support universal human rights, they should not tolerate violations of those rights, 
regardless of how deserving they perceive the target to be of treatment that violates his or 
her human rights.  However, as already discussed, I propose that people will tolerate 
specific violations of human rights to the extent that the target is seen to deserve the 
treatment that violates the right in question.  Given a tendency to ignore contextual 
factors when giving abstract opinions, I further argue that people will tolerate human 
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rights violations based on deservingness considerations, even when they endorse those 
universal human rights in an abstract sense. 
 Prior to my studies, no research had directly investigated the role that perceived 
deservingness plays in the discrepancy between abstract endorsement of universal human 
rights and toleration of specific violations of those rights.  For example, in the research 
on torture described in the previous section, participants’ abstract opinions about the right 
to humane treatment (United Nations, 2014a) were not assessed.  Thus, it is unknown 
whether endorsing or tolerating a human rights violation (where the suspect was 
presumably deserving of such treatment) diverged from participants’ abstract human 
rights attitudes, as I have proposed in this thesis. 
 The study by Staerklé and Clémence (2004) indirectly addressed the argument 
that I propose.  As noted earlier, they found that participants generally supported certain 
universal human rights, but that this support did not necessarily correspond with the 
degree to which they felt specific violations of those human rights were unacceptable.  
Staerklé and Clémence reasoned that differences in participants’ evaluations of the 
targets likely led participants to come to conclusions about the extent to which each of 
the targets deserved the treatment that violated his or her rights.  Some participants then 
presumably based their judgments about the violation on deservingness considerations 
rather than on their abstract support for the universal human rights in question.  However, 
this deservingness explanation was not tested directly.  Staerklé and Clémence did not 
measure the perceived deservingness of the victim and their attempt to manipulate the 
perceived negativity of the victim’s behaviour, presumably indicative of deservingness, 
was unsuccessful.   
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In summary, no previous research on human rights has tested whether perceived 
deservingness plays a role in the discrepancy between abstract endorsement of universal 
human rights and toleration of specific violations of those rights.  I attempted to fill this 
gap in the current study. 
The Current Study 
 For Part I of my thesis, I presented participants with two scenarios about the same 
human rights violation.  Similar to Carlsmith and Sood (2009), the two scenarios varied 
in the moral reprehensibility of the targets’ past transgression.  I measured both toleration 
of the human rights violation and the perceived deservingness of the target.  I predicted 
that there would be more toleration of the human rights violation when the target had 
committed a transgression that was high compared to low in moral reprehensibility 
(Hypothesis 1) and that this effect would be mediated by the target’s perceived 
deservingness (Hypothesis 2).  Additionally, before rating their reactions to the scenarios 
involving a human rights violation, I asked participants to rate their abstract endorsement 
of the specific right being violated.  I predicted that the moral reprehensibility of the 
target’s transgression would influence toleration of the human rights violations over and 
above participants’ abstract endorsement of the relevant universal human right 
(Hypothesis 3).  Also, I expected that some people would show a discrepancy, such that 
they would endorse the relevant universal human right in the abstract, but would tolerate 
at least one violation of that right (Hypothesis 4).  Finally, I expected that the extent of 
participants’ discrepancy would be greater for the high, compared to low, moral 
reprehensibility scenario (Hypothesis 5).  
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Summary 
 In summary, for the first part of my thesis I examined the problem of toleration of 
human rights violations.  Specifically, I explored whether deservingness considerations, 
based on the moral reprehensibility of a target’s past transgression, lead people to tolerate 
violations of the target’s rights.  I also examined whether the moral reprehensibility of a 
target’s past behaviour predicts toleration over and above people’s abstract attitudes 
toward the human right being violated.  Finally, I explored whether people show a 
discrepancy between their abstract attitudes toward a given right and their responses to 
specific violations of that right; and, if so, whether the influence of deservingness 
considerations accounts for this discrepancy.  Although previous studies have 
investigated conditions under which people tolerate human rights violations, these studies 
do not directly examine the role of perceived deservingness.  Part I of my thesis fills this 
gap by directly exploring the role of the target’s perceived deservingness on the toleration 
of human rights violations. 
Part II: A Possible Solution 
 As explained earlier, I expect that many people will show a discrepancy in their 
human rights attitudes, such that they will be supportive of a given human right in the 
abstract yet tolerate a violation of that human right in specific cases (perhaps due to 
deservingness considerations).  If there are situations in which it is deemed appropriate or 
tolerable to deny a person his or her human rights, then human rights are not deemed 
applicable to everyone, undermining the idea of universal human rights.   
 I take the position that universal human rights are desirable (for debate on this 
topic, see Donnelly, 2003).  For this reason, I believe it is important to understand how to 
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reduce the discrepancy between abstract support for human rights and responses in 
specific situations in such a way that reduces the toleration of human rights violations.  
Therefore, for Part II of my thesis, I attempted to change how people respond to a human 
rights violation, to make their responses more consistent with their abstract endorsement 
of the human right in question.  The technique I explored was called “hypocrisy 
induction.”  In this section of the Introduction, I summarize current research on hypocrisy 
induction as well as explain how I used this procedure in an attempt to make people less 
tolerant of a human rights violation. 
Hypocrisy Induction and Reducing Toleration of Human Rights Violations 
 One potential way to get people to act on their abstract endorsement of universal 
human rights, rather than on perceived deservingness of the target, is through inducing 
hypocrisy.  The hypocrisy induction technique involves getting people to privately 
recognize their previous actions that are not consistent with their publicly expressed 
attitude or position.  Recognizing their hypocrisy makes people uncomfortable, leading 
them to change their behaviour in order for it to be more in line with their publicly 
expressed attitude or position (Stone & Fernandez, 2008).  
 The hypocrisy induction procedure is based on the cognitive dissonance paradigm 
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).  In the original cognitive dissonance model, a discrepancy 
between two cognitive elements, for example two attitudes or an attitude and behaviour, 
leads to a state of negative arousal, called “psychological dissonance.”  In the initial study 
by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), participants were asked to perform a boring task and 
then tell another student that they enjoyed it.  They were paid $20, $1, or nothing (control 
condition).  As the task was not enjoyable, participants were expressing an attitude that 
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was not consistent with how they actually felt.  The dissonance resulting from the conflict 
between expressed and actual attitudes was greatest in the $1 condition, where the 
compensation was not enough to justify expressing the false attitude.  Participants in the 
$20 condition likely felt that the money was enough motivation to express the false 
attitude, hence doing so did not arouse any dissonance.  Participants in the $1 condition 
were motivated to relieve the dissonance aroused by expressing an attitude that was 
counter to how they really felt.  In support of this reasoning, participants in the $1 
condition were more likely to say that they would like to participate in a similar study in 
the future compared to participants in the other two conditions.  Presumably, the former 
were able to convince themselves that the task actually was relatively enjoyable.  These 
results suggest that, without enough outside motivation (e.g., getting paid a meaningful 
amount of money), expressing an attitude, or potentially a behaviour, that is inconsistent 
with the person’s actual attitude arouses dissonance, which motivates the person to adjust 
his or her actual attitude to fit the expressed attitude or behaviour. 
 Unlike in the original experiment, where participants adjusted their attitudes to 
reduce the dissonance, hypocrisy induction involves participants realizing the 
discrepancy between a strongly held attitude and their behaviour—that is, recognizing 
their hypocrisy—which leads them to adjust the behaviour to be more in line with their 
attitude (Stone & Fernandez, 2008).  Participants are first asked to publicly advocate in 
favour of their strongly held attitude, then they are asked to reflect on times when they 
have not lived up to their advocated standard (Stone & Fernandez, 2008).  Because it is 
possible to reduce the discrepancy either by changing the attitude or the behaviour, 
making sure that participants feel strongly about their position ensures that the attitude is 
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more resistant to change (Sherman & Gorkin, 1980).  Thus participants will change the 
behaviour to be more in line with the attitude, and not the other way around.  So far, 
hypocrisy induction has mainly been used to promote positive health behaviour (e.g., 
condom use; Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1997) and to encourage 
environmentally friendly practices (e.g., conserving electricity; Kantola et al., 1984).  For 
example, in the study by Stone and colleagues (1997), participants were asked to 
publically advocate for using condoms by being filmed while making a speech about the 
importance of using condoms.  Then, participants were told to reflect on times when they 
had failed to use condoms, under the pretence that they were helping to identify excuses 
that people might use when they fail to use condoms.  After privately recognizing their 
hypocrisy, participants were given the opportunity to reduce the discrepancy by either 
buying condoms and/or donating to a homeless shelter (to at least improve their self-
image).  When given the opportunity, most participants chose to reduce the dissonance 
directly by purchasing condoms.  Similar to these studies, I tried to induce hypocrisy by 
getting participants to first publicly advocate their abstract support for a given human 
right, and then focus on the discrepancy between their advocated position and their 
previous toleration of a specific violation of that right.  Assuming that people strongly 
endorse the relevant human right in the abstract, I expected the hypocrisy induction 
procedure to lead to decreased toleration of violations of that right (and not a change in 
general endorsement of the right).   
The Current Study 
 In Part II of the current study, I examined whether hypocrisy induction would be 
an effective method for reducing the toleration of a human rights violation.  My 
  24 
 
hypocrisy induction experiment was slightly different from most previous experiments in 
this field.  In many previous studies, the researchers were able to assume that their 
participants were already in favour of whatever attitude they were advocating and that 
they had likely acted in ways that went against this position at some point in the past.  For 
example, given the social desirability of using condoms, Stone et al. (1997) could assume 
that their student participants would strongly endorse this practice.  Yet, given that it is 
not unusual for people to occasionally neglect to use condoms, Stone et al. (1997) could 
also assume that many of their participants would also be able to recall a time when they 
had not used condoms.  Thus these authors could assume that participants would be 
inconsistent between their expressed position and their actual behaviour, giving the 
hypocrisy induction procedure the chance to be effective.   
 For the current study, unlike the hypocrisy induction studies discussed previously, 
it was less clear whether or not most participants would (1) strongly endorse the human 
right in question and (2) be able to recall times when they acted in ways that were 
inconsistent with their support for this human right.  However, for the first part of my 
study, I assessed participants’ abstract support for a universal human right, as well as 
their reactions to specific violations of that right; assessing these constructs in Part I 
provided some participants with a recent example of a time when they were hypocritical.  
Then in Part II, participants were randomly assigned to either the hypocrisy or control 
conditions, as in the Stone et al. (1997) and other similar experiments.  Participants in the 
hypocrisy induction condition were given the opportunity to recognize any discrepancy 
that might exist between their support for the human right in general and their toleration 
of violations of that right in specific situations, as assessed in Part I of the study.  All 
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participants were then given the opportunity to act in a way that was consistent with their 
overall support for the relevant human right.  Only those who supported the human right 
in the abstract were retained for analysis in Part II, as the hypocrisy induction procedure 
is irrelevant for participants who did not support the relevant human right in the abstract.  
Retaining only participants for whom the procedure is relevant has been used in similar 
hypocrisy induction experiments (see Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002).  I hypothesized that 
participants in the hypocrisy induction condition would respond in a way that expressed 
less toleration for the human rights violations relative to the control group (Hypothesis 6). 
Summary 
 For the second part of my thesis, I explored one possible solution to the toleration 
of human rights violations.  Given that people show a discrepancy between their abstract 
support for certain human rights and their toleration of specific violations of those human 
rights, I reasoned that hypocrisy induction would reduce this toleration.  The hypocrisy 
induction procedure involves having participants advocate a position, then privately 
recall times in which they did not live up to that position (i.e., a time when they behaved 
hypocritically).  Recognizing their hypocrisy creates a state of psychological dissonance, 
which participants are motivated to reduce by changing their behaviour to be more 
consistent with their advocated position.  Although this procedure had been used in 
previous experiments to promote positive health behaviours and environmentally friendly 
practices, until the present study, it had not been used in the context of human rights.   
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Hypotheses 
 The UDHR specifies that everyone is entitled to humane treatment and not to be 
tortured (United Nations, 2014a).  For both parts of my thesis, I chose to focus on support 
for and toleration of violations of this particular right. 
Part I 
 For the first part of my thesis, participants answered questions about their abstract 
support for the right to humane treatment (among other items), and then gave their 
reactions to scenarios about specific violations of this right.  The moral reprehensibility 
of the target’s past transgression was varied.  Based on research suggesting that people 
have a need to see that individuals get what they deserve, as well as research on human 
rights violations, I hypothesized the following.   
Hypothesis 1:  There would be more toleration of the rights violation when the target 
committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression compared to when the target 
committed a less morally reprehensible transgression.   
Hypothesis 2:  The effect of the moral reprehensibility of the target’s transgression would 
be mediated by his perceived deservingness.  Deservingness was examined as a 
mediator because the effect of the target’s moral reprehensibility on the toleration of 
the target’s torture was expected to work through deservingness judgments.  
Specifically, I expected that, when the target committed a highly morally 
reprehensible transgression, participants would see him as more deserving of the 
treatment that violated his rights, and, therefore, would show greater toleration for the 
violation.  
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 Based on research suggesting a tendency for people to ignore contextual factors 
when forming abstract opinions (resulting in a discrepancy between their abstract 
opinions and situation-specific reactions), I hypothesized the following.  
Hypothesis 3:  The effect of the moral reprehensibility of the target’s transgression on the 
toleration of a human rights violation (i.e., Hypothesis 1) would hold over and above 
participants’ previously reported attitudes about the right to humane treatment.   
Hypothesis 4:  Some participants would show a discrepancy between their abstract 
support for the right to humane treatment and their toleration of a specific violation of 
that right, such that they would express support for the right to humane treatment in 
the abstract, but tolerate the violation of this right in at least one of the scenarios.   
Hypothesis 5:  The extent to which participants were discrepant would be greater for the 
high, compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario.   
Part II 
 For the second part of my thesis, participants were assigned to either a hypocrisy 
induction or control condition in which they were asked about the human rights scenario 
on which they were the most discrepant in Part I.  Then, along with other measures, all 
participants completed similar response items for the same human rights scenarios from 
Part I.  Before being debriefed, participants also had the opportunity to ask for further 
information on universal human rights.  Based on the hypocrisy induction literature, I 
hypothesized the following. 
Hypothesis 6a:  Among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those 
who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would become less tolerant 
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of the torture (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the 
hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. 
Hypothesis 6b:  Among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those 
who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more willing to 
help the target of the human rights violation (when asked to respond to the same 
scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control 
condition.   
Hypothesis 6c:  Among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those 
who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more likely to ask 
for additional information about supporting human rights if they were in the 
hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.  
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Method 
This study consisted of one session divided into two parts.  For the first part of the 
study, I looked at individuals’ abstract opinions about universal human rights and their 
willingness to tolerate a human rights violation.  Specifically, I looked at participants’ 
abstract opinion about the right to protection against torture (i.e., the right to humane 
treatment) and their willingness to tolerate a specific case of torture.  For the second part 
of the study, I looked at whether or not hypocrisy induction is an effective way to make 
participants less tolerant of the human rights violation, thus making their situation-
specific responses more consistent with their abstract support for the particular right in 
question. 
Participants 
 I recruited 223 Brock University students (197 female, 26 male) for this study 
using the university’s Psychology Research Pool website (SONA).1  Participants’ ages 
ranged from 18 to 55 years (M = 19.46, SD = 3.80).  The students signed up for a study 
on “Personal Opinions about Current Events and a Writing Task,” and received course 
credit for their participation.  Most participants were run alone, but 38 participants were 
run simultaneously, 2 or 3 at a time.  Those participants who completed the study in 
groups completed the tasks in separate, private computer stations.  
 Similar to the organization of the introduction, the remainder of this section has 
been broken into two main parts.  The first part involves the role of deservingness in 
tolerating human rights violations, as well as the discrepancy between abstract support 
for a human right and the toleration of specific violations of that right.  The second part 
                                                
1 Two participants asked to have their data removed from the dataset.  Their data were not analyzed and 
these participants were not included in the reported sample size. 
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involves decreasing toleration of specific human rights violations through hypocrisy 
induction.  Figure 1 presents a visual overview of the procedure.  Each step of this 
procedure will be explained in detail in subsequent sections. 
Part I 
 Procedure and manipulation.  The first part of this study involved testing 
Hypotheses 1 through 5.  That is, this portion of the procedure allowed me to test my 
hypotheses regarding the tendency for individuals to base their reactions to human rights 
violations on deservingness considerations, and for these reactions to be at odds with 
their abstract endorsement of human rights.  
 The researcher first told participants that there would be two studies taking place 
during the session, so they had to sign one consent form for the first study and another 
form, part way through the session, for the second study (see Appendix A).  The rest of 
the procedure for Part I was completed on the computer, using Qualtrics.  After signing 
the first consent form, the experimenter showed students their participant ID number and 
then recorded it in a log.  Participants were told that this ID would be used to record if 
any computer malfunctions took place during the session.  The actual reason for the 
participant ID was to connect their responses on the surveys to the behavioural measure 
at the end of the study.   
 Participants then filled out the demographics form (see Appendix B), followed by 
measures of individual differences in right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996; see 
Appendix C), social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; 
see Appendix D) and preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; see 
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Figure 1.  Overview of the procedure for the current study. Participants responded to the same items after 
the scenarios for both Parts I and II, with the addition of the behavioural intention items for Part II.
First Informed Consent 
Participants read and respond to six 
scenarios (2 torture, 4 filler) 
Demographic items 
Attention check item 
Random Assignment 
Control Hypocrisy 
Write about importance of 
supporting the right to 
humane treatment 
Write about importance of 
supporting the right to 
humane treatment 
Write about feeling 
conflicted about supporting 
the right to humane 
treatment 
Participant and experimenter record ID 
Preference for Consistency Scale 
Computer error 
Participants read and respond to four of 
the original scenarios (2 torture, 2 filler) 
Affect measure 
Opportunity to get more information on 
supporting human rights 
Verbal Debriefing and Re-consent 
Second Informed Consent 
Part I 
Part II 
Experimenter enters password 
Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale with 
human rights items 
Social Dominance Orientation Scale 
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Appendix E).  The individual differences were included as exploratory moderator 
variables.  None of the tentative hypotheses including these variables were supported; 
thus, they will not be mentioned further (except in footnotes).  Additionally, participants 
indicated their abstract support for human rights in general and the right to humane 
treatment (see Appendix C).  The items about support for human rights were hidden in 
the right-wing authoritarianism scale in order to conceal the fact that I was interested in 
the discrepancy between their abstract endorsement of human rights and how they 
responded to the human rights scenarios.   
 After responding to these measures, participants read six scenarios (see Appendix 
F).  Participants were told that all of the scenarios were based on actual news stories.  
Two of these scenarios depicted torture during an interrogation (a violation of the right to 
humane treatment) and the other four were filler scenarios (two about a forest fire and 
two about a car accident).  The two scenarios for the human rights violation varied in the 
moral reprehensibility of the target’s past transgression; one involving a target who 
committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression and one where the target had 
committed a less morally reprehensible transgression.  Thus, the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation was within-subjects.  Aside from the manipulation, the two scenarios 
involved the same sequence of events, differing only in the order of some of the words as 
well as the names of the characters.   
 The scenarios about torture were based on the scenario used by Carlsmith and 
Sood (2009).  In each of these scenarios, participants read about an Afghani man (either 
Farid or Sahad) who was detained while working near an insurgent encampment.  The 
man was interrogated based on the suspicion that he might have overheard some useful 
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information, and the interrogation involved torture.  Participants were also told that the 
man had been involved with an extremist group when he was a teenager, but that he had 
not been in contact with the group for several years.  For the current study, the moral 
reprehensibility of the target’s past actions differed based on what the target had done 
while he was involved with the extremist group.  In the high moral reprehensibility 
scenario, the target had sniped four school children in order to create a distraction during 
an attack.  In the low moral reprehensibility scenario, the target had injured four soldiers 
during an ambush.  It is important to note that the interrogation in both scenarios was not 
related to the target’s past actions.  Moreover, both scenarios indicated that the target 
repeatedly said that he did not have any information on terrorist activities. 
 The four filler scenarios were also about serious situations, but did not deal with 
human rights violations.  The order of the scenarios was counterbalanced, such that 
participants were randomly assigned to one of four different orders.  The four orders that 
were used can be seen in Figure 2.  The torture scenarios were always shown second and 
fifth.  Scenarios about the same issue did not appear consecutively.   
 Following each of the human rights scenarios, participants answered a few 
questions about their perceptions of the target and the rights violation.  These questions 
included measures of toleration of the rights violation, how deserving the target was 
perceived to be of harsh treatment, and the perceived morality of the target and his past 
behaviour (see Appendix G).  Similar questions followed the filler scenarios, though 
these were not analyzed (see Appendix H).  Finally, participants filled out an attention 
check that asked them to identify the highest value from a list of four numbers (see 
Appendix I).  
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Figure 2.  The four different orders of scenarios in Part I.  
 Dependent measures.  
 Toleration items (Cronbach’s α = .88 [low moral reprehensibility scenario], 
Cronbach’s α = .85 [high moral reprehensibility scenario]).  Three items assessed the 
extent to which the participants tolerated the human rights violation described in the 
scenario (e.g., “The severity of the treatment was appropriate”).  Participants rated the 
extent to which they agreed with each statement from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree).  High scores on the composite variable indicated high toleration (see  
Appendix G). 
 Deservingness items (r = .53 [low moral reprehensibility scenario], r = .65 [high 
moral reprehensibility scenario]).  Two items assessed the degree to which participants 
perceived that the target deserved the treatment that he received in the scenario (e.g., 
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Reprehensibility 
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Filler  
Scenario 2 
Filler  
Scenario 4 
Filler  
Scenario 1 
Filler  
Scenario 2 
Low Moral 
Reprehensibility 
Scenario 
Filler  
Scenario 3 
Filler  
Scenario 1 
Filler  
Scenario 4 
Low Moral 
Reprehensibility 
Scenario 
High Moral 
Reprehensibility 
Scenario 
Low Moral 
Reprehensibility 
Scenario 
High Moral 
Reprehensibility 
Scenario 
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“Farid deserved treatment that was this severe”).  Participants rated the extent to which 
they agreed with each statement from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  High 
scores on the composite variable indicated high perceived deservingness (see  
Appendix G).2 
 Manipulation check. 
 Morality items (Cronbach’s α = .79 [low moral reprehensibility scenario], 
Cronbach’s α = .82 [high moral reprehensibility scenario]).  After the dependent 
variables, four items assessed the perceived morality of the target and his behaviour (e.g., 
“To what extent do you think Farid is a good or bad person?”).  These served as a check 
for the moral reprehensibility manipulation.  Participants rated the items from 1 (very 
bad/immoral) to 7 (very good/moral).  High scores on the composite variable indicated 
high perceived morality (see Appendix G). 
 Other variables. 
 Support for the right to humane treatment.  One item assessed participants’ 
abstract support for the right to humane treatment (“No one should ever be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment for any reason”).  
Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with this statement from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  High scores indicated high support for the right to 
humane treatment (see Appendix C). 
 Support for universal human rights in general.  For exploratory purposes, there 
was one item assessing participants’ abstract support for universal human rights in 
general (“Human rights should be universal, meaning they are granted to everyone [e.g., 
                                                
2 Originally there were three items assessing deservingness.  One of the items was dropped (“[Farid/Sahad] 
deserved to be tortured.”) because it correlated too highly with the toleration items, r = .882, and thus was 
not deemed sufficiently different from toleration. 
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regardless of race, gender, behaviour, sexual orientation]”).  Participants rated the extent 
to which they agreed with this statement from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
High scores indicated high support for human rights in general (see Appendix C). 
 Likelihood of having information item.  One item assessed how likely 
participants thought it was that the target had important information about terrorist 
activities (see Appendix G).  Participants used a scale ranging from 0% (no chance) to 
100% (definitely).  I thought that this variable could be an additional, more utilitarian, 
mediator of the relation between moral reprehensibility and toleration, aside from 
perceived deservingness.  This variable was exploratory; thus, it is not reflected in the 
hypotheses.   
 Attention check.  For this item, participants were shown a list of four values and 
asked to select the highest value.  The first two values were calculated by adding the 
values for participants’ responses to the abstract support for humane treatment item and 
the average of their responses on the three toleration items (e.g., if the participant selected 
4 on the abstract support for humane treatment item and had an average score of 5 for the 
three toleration items, then their score would be 9).  These values can be seen as 
“discrepancy scores” because they represent the magnitude of the disagreement between 
participants’ abstract support for the right to humane treatment and toleration of torture.  
Because participants gave toleration ratings for each of the two scenarios involving 
torture, a discrepancy score was calculated for each of these scenarios.  High discrepancy 
scores indicated a large discrepancy between participants’ abstract support for humane 
treatment and their toleration of torture in a scenario.  The first value that participants 
could choose was their discrepancy score for the low moral reprehensibility scenario.  
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The second value that participants could choose was their discrepancy score for the high 
moral reprehensibility scenario.  The third and fourth values that participants could select 
were their discrepancy scores for the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios minus 
one (e.g., if the discrepancy score for the low moral reprehensibility scenario was 8, then 
the third option would have been 7).   
 The higher of the first two options indicated on which scenario the participant was 
the most discrepant.  When the participant clicked on the highest value, the survey then 
selected the appropriate materials for Part II; that is, for those in the hypocrisy condition, 
the survey was programmed to show the materials related to the torture scenario on which 
the participant was the most discrepant.  Thus, the response to this question selected the 
materials that the participant saw for Part II.  The materials for Part II will be explained in 
detail in the next section. 
 Additionally, this item was used as an attention check.  If participants did not 
select the highest value, it indicated that they were not paying attention and that their 
responses might not be valid. 
Part II 
 Procedure and manipulation.  The second part of this study involved testing 
Hypotheses 6a to 6c.  That is, this portion of the procedure allowed me to test my 
hypotheses regarding hypocrisy induction. 
 The scenario on which a participant showed the greatest discrepancy was the 
scenario that was used for that participant in the second part of the study (for most 
people, this was expected to be the scenario in which the target committed a highly 
morally reprehensible transgression).  Directly after finishing the attention 
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check/discrepancy score item, participants were brought to a screen that alerted them that 
they had completed Study 1 and needed to contact the researcher, who would enter a 
password to begin Study 2.  At this point, the researcher gave participants the second 
informed consent form (see Appendix A) for what participants were told was a different 
project on emotions and persuasive writing style. 
 Once the participant signed the informed consent form, the researcher entered the 
password and the participant began the next task.  The rest of the procedure for Part II 
was administered on the computer via Qualtrics, with the exception of the behavioural 
measure (which is explained later on in this section).  The next screen explained the 
writing task to the participants (see Appendix J).  These instructions were the start of the 
hypocrisy induction procedure.  The survey software randomly assigned participants to 
either the hypocrisy or control condition, thus keeping the researcher blind to 
participants’ conditions.  Similar to Son Hing et al. (2002), participants were told on the 
instruction screen that they were completing a study on emotions and persuasive writing.  
The instructions explained that their topic for the persuasive writing task was to explain 
why they believed it was important to support the right to humane treatment.  
Additionally, they were told that selected excerpts from some of the essays would be 
used in promotional materials on campus.  Thus, this first writing task served as 
participants’ public endorsement of the right to humane treatment.  Participants in the 
control condition only completed the first writing task.  That is, they only wrote about 
why it was important to support the right to humane treatment.  Participants in the 
hypocrisy induction condition, however, completed an extension of the writing task, 
which is explained in the following section. 
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 Hypocrisy induction.  After advocating their support for human rights in the first 
writing task, the next screen for participants in the hypocrisy induction condition said, 
“To get a better understanding of how people think about human rights, we have an 
additional question about your thoughts and opinions related to human rights.”  
Participants were told that the researcher was interested in understanding why people 
might be conflicted about supporting human rights and, for this reason, they were asked 
to write a second part of the essay.  The instructions for this task read,  
In order to help you think of an example of when you might feel conflicted about 
supporting this right, we have chosen one of the scenarios related to human rights 
from the previous study for you to use to come up with ideas.  The scenario and 
your responses are displayed below.   
 In order to make some of the participants feel hypocritical, specifically those who 
tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios, the screen displayed the scenario on which 
participants were most discrepant as well as the associated responses.  Participants had to 
scroll past the original responses in order to begin writing.  See Appendix K for the 
complete instructions. 
 Both conditions.  After completing the writing task, all participants filled out the 
affect measure used in the Son Hing et al. (2002) hypocrisy induction study (originally 
used in Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; see Appendix L).  This measure allowed 
me to see whether or not participants in the hypocrisy condition were experiencing the 
emotions associated with dissonance arousal. 
 After the participants completed the affect measure, they pressed “Submit” and 
were taken to a screen that looked identical to the actual Qualtrics submit screen.  Above 
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the loading bar they saw a message that said, “Please wait while your responses are 
validated.  This should only take a moment.”  After three seconds the screen 
automatically went to the next page where an alert box displayed an error message.  The 
message informed participants that several questions, images, or text were not displayed 
correctly.  After clicking “OK” on the error message, the instructions on the screen told 
participants to contact the researcher for assistance.  The researcher then asked 
participants to please complete the pages again.  The researcher also explained to 
participants that it was important that their responses were genuine, otherwise it might 
interfere with the results.  For this reason, participants were told to respond based on how 
they felt at that time, rather than trying to recall their previous responses.  Participants 
were told that their current responses would replace those that they previously entered.  
See Appendix M for the submit screen and the full error message that was displayed.  
 Next, participants were asked to re-read two of the human rights scenarios and 
two of the filler scenarios from Part I.  They also answered the same response items as in 
Part I of the study, but with a couple of added behavioural intention items (see Appendix 
N).  Because the four filler scenarios were not important to the research question, 
participants only read and responded to two of the filler scenarios instead of all four.  
Participants were shown more than just the torture scenarios to help avoid suspicion, in 
that participants could have started to guess at the purpose of the study if they were 
shown only one particular type of scenario multiple times. 
 Once participants finished with the scenarios and response items, the submit page 
told them to tell the researcher that they were finished.  Before starting the debriefing, the 
researcher gave participants a slip of paper and told them that if they wanted more 
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information on universal human rights and how they could help promote such rights, they 
could write their email down on the slip of paper and drop it in a box near the door before 
being debriefed.  The slips of paper had a small number written on one of the corners, 
which the researcher wrote down in the log next to the participant ID before giving it to 
the participant.  The number was written before the session began, when the participant 
was not present.  Whether participants sought out further information on human rights 
was used as a behavioural indicator of the effectiveness of the hypocrisy procedure.  
Finally, the participants were verbally debriefed (see Appendix O) and then asked to re-
consent (see Appendix P) to having their data included in the study.  Before leaving, 
participants were given a printed debriefing form (see Appendix Q). 
 Dependent measures. 
 Scenario response items.  The items used to measure the toleration of the 
violation (α = .88 [low moral reprehensibility scenario], α = .92 [high moral 
reprehensibility scenario]), perceived deservingness (r = .59 [low moral reprehensibility 
scenario], r = .67 [high moral reprehensibility scenario]), and perceived morality (α = .84 
[low moral reprehensibility scenario], α = .85 [high moral reprehensibility scenario]) 
were all the same as those used in Part I of this study.  See Appendix G for the complete 
items. 
 Behavioural intention items (r = .69 [low moral reprehensibility scenario],  
r = .66 [high moral reprehensibility scenario]).  These two items assessed how 
participants intended to behave with regards to the rights violation from the scenario 
(e.g., “If Farid’s case were brought to trial, how willing would you be to make a donation 
to help cover his legal fees?”).  Participants rated the extent to which they were willing to 
  42 
 
behave in a way that favoured the target of the human rights violation from 1 (not at all 
willing) to 9 (completely willing).  High scores on the composite variable indicated high 
willingness to help the target.  See Appendix N for the complete list of these items. 
 Behavioural measure.  Whether or not a participant asked to be emailed further 
information about human rights was used to test the effect of the hypocrisy induction 
procedure on the participant’s behaviour.  This measure was coded as 1 if the participant 
requested further information and 0 if the participant did not request further information. 
 Manipulation check. 
 Affect measure (Monteith et al., 1993, Cronbach’s α = .92).  Participants rated 
the extent to which each of 29 emotions described their state after the essay task, using a 
scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much).  The 14 items from 
the Negative Emotions Toward the Self and Discomfort subscales were averaged to 
create a composite measure of negative arousal.  High scores indicated greater negative 
arousal.  The other subscales were not analyzed, as they were not relevant to the study.  
See Appendix L for the complete measure. 
Experimental Design and Data Analysis 
 This section provides detailed explanations of the analysis methods used in the 
current study.  The information is organized by Part I and Part II, as well as by 
hypothesis. 
 Part I. 
 Hypothesis 1.  I expected that participants would tolerate the torture more when 
the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression compared to when 
the target committed a less morally reprehensible transgression.  To analyze the results 
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for this hypothesis, I used a paired-samples t test with toleration as the dependent variable 
and the moral reprehensibility of the target’s behaviour as the within-subjects 
independent variable. 
 Hypothesis 2.  I expected that the effect of the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation on toleration would be mediated by the degree to which participants 
thought the target was deserving of harsh treatment.  To analyze the results for this 
hypothesis, I used the method for testing within-subjects mediation described by Judd, 
Kenny, and McClelland (2001).   
 In a between-subjects mediation model, the independent variable indirectly affects 
the dependent variable through a mediator variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986).3  To show 
evidence of between-subjects mediation, the researcher must establish that (1) the 
independent variable predicts the dependent variable, (2) the independent variable 
predicts the mediator variable, (3) the mediator predicts the dependent variable, and (4) 
the relation between the independent variable and the dependent variable is no longer 
significant or is significantly reduced after accounting for the mediator variable.  
Similarly, in the within-subjects mediation analysis described by Judd et al. (2001), a 
within-subjects independent variable indirectly causes differences in the dependent 
variable by first causing differences in a mediator variable.  Additionally, this method 
involves testing whether subject-level differences in the proposed mediator variable 
moderate the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.  Similar to 
between-subjects mediation analysis, within-subjects mediation is examined using 
                                                
3 For the purpose of clarity in this explanation, I am referring to the predictor variable in a mediation model 
as the independent variable and the outcome variable as the dependent variable.  
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several steps that test each path in the mediation model.  The conceptual mediation model 
that is tested using this method is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  The conceptual within-subjects mediation model.  Paths are labelled according to the step in 
which they are tested. 
 Step 1 in this method establishes that the independent variable predicts the 
dependent variable.  This can be shown using a paired-samples t test.  Step 2 establishes 
that the independent variable predicts the mediator variable.  Like in Step 1, this can be 
shown using a paired-samples t test. 
 In Step 3, the mediator is shown to predict the dependent variable.  The three 
components involved in establishing this relationship when there are two experimental 
conditions (as in the present study) are as follows: (i) the mediator variable must predict 
the dependent variable for the first condition, (ii) the mediator variable must predict the 
dependent variable for the second condition, and (iii) within-subject differences in the 
mediator must predict within-subjects differences in the dependent variable (Figure 4 
shows a conceptual model of these components).   
Independent 
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Within-subject 
differences in the 
Dependent Variable 
Within-subject 
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Mediator 
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Figure 4.  The three components of Step 3 for within-subjects mediation analysis. 
The first two components can be tested by regressing the dependent variable onto the 
mediator variable within each level of the independent variable separately.  The third 
component involves first creating difference scores for the mediator and dependent 
variable.  These scores represent the within-subject differences in the mediator and 
dependent variable between the levels of the independent variable.  In order to show that 
within-subject differences in the mediator predict within-subject differences in the 
dependent variable, the differences in the dependent variable are regressed onto 
differences in the mediator.  If the mediator does predict the dependent variable within 
each level of the independent variable, and within-subjects differences in the mediator 
predict within-subjects differences in the dependent variable, then either partial or full 
mediation is present. 
 Before determining whether full or partial mediation has occurred, in Step 4, the 
researcher examines whether stable, subject-level differences in the proposed mediator 
moderate the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.  Subject-level 
differences represent participants’ overall scores on a particular variable, outside of the 
within-subjects effect of condition (e.g., some participants will have higher scores on the 
Mediator Variable 
(condition 2) 
Dependent 
Variable 
(condition 2) 
Mediator Variable 
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Dependent 
Variable 
(condition 1) 
Within-subject 
Differences in the 
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Within-subject 
Differences in the 
Dependent Variable 
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mediator compared to other participants, regardless of condition).  It is possible that 
stable, subject-level differences in the proposed mediator interact with the independent 
variable to predict the dependent variable.  That is, the proposed mediator could also be a 
moderator of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.  To 
examine whether moderation is present, a final regression analysis is conducted (see 
Figure 5).  For this analysis, the researcher first computes a subject-level score for the 
proposed mediator, which is done by calculating the sum of the scores for the mediator 
across each level of the independent variable (i.e., for each participant, add the score for 
the first condition to the score for the second condition).  The summed scores are then 
centred.  The within-subjects differences in the dependent variable are regressed onto 
within-subject differences in the mediator and the centred sum for the mediator variable.  
If the centred sum significantly predicts the dependent variable, then moderation is 
present. 
 Finally, in Step 5, the statistical significance of the intercept in the final regression 
equation, as described at the end of the previous paragraph and in Figure 5, is examined 
to determine whether full or partial mediation is present.  The intercept represents the 
average within-subject difference in the dependent variable between the two conditions 
of the independent variable.  If the intercept is significantly different from zero, the 
independent variable still significantly predicts the dependent variable after accounting 
for both within-subject differences in the mediator and the centred sum of the proposed 
mediator.  If within-subject differences in the mediator significantly predict within-
subject differences in the dependent variable and the intercept is not significantly 
different from zero, then full mediation is present.  If within-subject differences in the 
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mediator significantly predict within-subject differences in the dependent variable and the 
intercept is significantly different from zero, then partial mediation is present.  
 
Figure 5.  The within-subjects mediation model tested in the final regression equation.  The equation 
includes labels that correspond to those in the conceptual model. 
 For Hypothesis 2 of the present study, the within-subjects independent variable 
was the moral reprehensibility of the target’s past behaviour.  The within-subjects 
mediator variable was the perceived deservingness of the target for harsh treatment.  The 
within-subjects dependent variable was the toleration of the target’s torture in an 
interrogation.  Figure 6 shows the conceptual model being tested for Hypothesis 2 in 
terms of the specific study variables. 
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Figure 6.  The conceptual model being tested in Hypothesis 2. 
 Hypothesis 3.  I hypothesized that the effect of the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation on the toleration of torture would hold over and above participants’ 
expressed support for the right to humane treatment.  That is, I expected that differences 
in participants’ toleration of the torture in the two scenarios would not be dependent on 
their abstract support for the right to humane treatment.  If participants were focusing on 
their abstract attitude toward the right to humane treatment (i.e., which expressed 
agreement that no one should ever be tortured) then they should not have tolerated the 
torture more when the target committed the more reprehensible transgression.  However, 
if participants were tolerating the torture over and above their abstract support for the 
right to humane treatment, then, although those higher in abstract support for the right to 
humane treatment might tolerate the torture less overall, the differences in their toleration 
between the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios should be comparable to those 
lower in abstract support for the right to humane treatment.  In summary, if participants 
tolerated the torture based on the moral reprehensibility of the target’s past actions over 
and above their abstract support for humane treatment, then the effect of the moral 
reprehensibility manipulation on the toleration of torture should not be moderated by 
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Reprehensibility 
Within-subject 
differences in 
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abstract support for the right to humane treatment.  To examine whether this was the 
case, I used the method described by Judd et al. (2001) for examining an individual 
difference moderator of a within-subjects experimental effect. 
 According to Judd et al. (2001), there are two possible ways in which an 
individual difference variable can have an effect on a within-subjects variable.  The first 
type of effect is referred to as “parallel functions,” where the slopes for the effect of the 
individual difference variable on the dependent variable in each level of the independent 
variable are parallel to one another.  Parallel slopes indicate that the effect of the 
individual difference variable does not significantly differ depending on condition (see 
Figure 7).  This effect indicates that there is a consistent main effect of the individual 
difference variable on the within-subjects dependent variable, but that it does not interact 
with the effect of the independent variable.  
 
Figure 7.  Example graph of parallel functions.  This figure shows that the individual difference variable 
has a consistent main effect on the dependent variable, and that this effect does not differ based on 
condition.  
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D
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– 
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 The second type of effect is referred to as “nonparallel functions,” where the 
slopes for the effect of the individual difference variable on the dependent variable in 
each level of the independent variable are not parallel (see Figure 8).  Nonparallel slopes 
indicate that the individual difference variable moderates the effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable.  Judd et al.’s (2001) method for examining an 
individual difference moderator of a within-subjects effect is used to determine whether 
or not the slopes for the effect of the individual difference variable on the within-subject 
dependent variable in each level of the independent variable are parallel.  The details of 
this method are described in the following paragraphs. 
 
Figure 8.  Example graph of nonparallel functions.  This figure shows that the effect of the individual 
difference variable on the dependent variable differs based on condition. 
 In between-subjects moderation, the moderator variable affects the dependent 
variable by interacting with the independent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  Testing 
between-subjects moderation involves first testing the main effects of the independent 
and moderator variables on the dependent variable, then testing the interaction effect of 
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the independent and moderator variables on the dependent variable.  Similarly, the 
within-subjects moderation analysis described by Judd et al. (2001) involves first 
examining the main effects of the within-subjects independent variable and the potential 
moderator variable (i.e., the individual difference variable) on the within-subjects 
dependent variable, then examining the interaction effect of the within-subjects 
independent variable and the potential moderator variable on within-subject differences 
in the dependent variable.  The conceptual moderation model that is being tested using 
this method is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  The conceptual within-subjects moderation model.  Paths are labelled according to the step on 
which they are tested.  Steps 2 and 3 test the main effects of the moderator variable on the dependent 
variable for each condition; thus, separate models for these steps are shown at the bottom of the figure. 
 The first step in this method establishes that there is an effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable.  As in the method for within-subjects mediation, this 
effect can be tested using a paired-samples t test.  The second step establishes that there is 
a main effect of the potential moderator variable on the dependent variable in the first 
condition.  The third step establishes that there is a main effect of the potential moderator 
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variable on the dependent variable in the second condition.  The second and third steps 
for this method are both tested using regression; for each condition, the dependent 
variable is regressed onto the potential moderator variable.   
 Finally, the fourth step establishes whether the potential moderator variable 
interacts with the independent variable to predict within-subject differences in the 
dependent variable.  This is done in a final regression analysis where within-subject 
differences in the dependent variable are regressed onto the potential moderator variable.  
Figure 10 shows the conceptual model being tested by the final regression equation.  
 
Figure 10.  The within-subjects moderation model tested by the final regression equation.  The equation at 
the bottom of the figure includes labels that correspond to those in the conceptual model. 
 If the potential moderator variable significantly predicts differences in the 
dependent variable, then the effect of the potential moderator variable on the dependent 
variable depends on the condition and, therefore, moderation is present.  This effect 
indicates that the slopes of the lines for each level of the independent variable are not 
parallel.  If there is a consistent main effect of the individual difference variable on each 
level of the dependent variable (as tested in the second and third steps), but moderation is 
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not present, then the slopes of the lines for each level of the independent variable are 
parallel. 
 For Hypothesis 3 in the present study, the within-subjects independent variable 
was the moral reprehensibility of the target’s past behaviour.  The potential moderator 
variable was participants’ abstract support for the right to humane treatment.  The within-
subjects dependent variable was the toleration of the target’s torture in an interrogation.  
If participants tolerated the use of torture based on the moral reprehensibility of the 
target’s transgression over and above their abstract support for the right to humane 
treatment, then abstract support for humane treatment should not moderate the effect of 
the moral reprehensibility manipulation.  Additionally, if moderation was not present, I 
expected the slopes for the effect of abstract support for humane treatment on toleration 
in each of the scenarios to be parallel.  Figure 11 shows the conceptual model being 
tested for this hypothesis. 
 
Figure 11.  The conceptual model being tested in Hypothesis 3. 
 Hypothesis 4.  I expected that some participants would show a discrepancy 
between their abstract support for the right to humane treatment and their toleration of a 
specific violation of that right.  Namely, I expected some participants to express support 
for humane treatment in the abstract, but tolerate at least one of the specific violations of 
this right presented in the scenarios. 
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 In the current study, participants were considered to be “discrepant” if they 
supported the right to humane treatment in the abstract, but tolerated the use of torture in 
at least one of the scenarios.  Supporting the right to humane treatment in the abstract was 
operationalized as a rating of more than 4 (neutral) for the item that asked participants 
the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that everyone should be treated humanely 
and no one should be tortured.  Tolerating the torture was operationalized as a toleration 
composite score of greater than or equal to 4 (neutral) for at least one of the torture 
scenarios.  Thus, participants who were identified as discrepant were those who agreed 
with the right to humane treatment in the abstract, but reported neutral or supportive 
attitudes toward the torture in at least one of the torture scenarios. 
 I tested Hypothesis 4 by examining the frequency of participants who were 
discrepant for each of the torture scenarios and the overall number of participants who 
were discrepant on at least one of the scenarios.  Note that this test involves only 
descriptive, and not inferential, statistics. 
 Hypothesis 5.  I hypothesized that the extent to which participants were discrepant 
would be greater for the high, compared to the low, moral reprehensibility scenario.  I 
tested this hypothesis using a paired-samples t test with moral reprehensibility as the 
within-subjects independent variable and the magnitude of discrepancy between abstract 
support for humane treatment and toleration of torture as the dependent variable. 
The magnitude of discrepancy was computed by first reverse scoring participants’ 
average toleration in each of the scenarios, such that higher average scores for toleration 
indicated low support for humane treatment in specific scenarios (e.g., if a participant’s 
average toleration score was 7, the reverse-coded score indicating his or her situation-
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specific support for humane treatment would be 1).  Next, participants’ scores for 
situation-specific support for humane treatment for each scenario were subtracted from 
their abstract support for humane treatment scores.  Scores close to zero indicated 
consistency between abstract and situation-specific support for humane treatment.  
Positive scores indicated greater abstract support than situation-specific support for 
humane treatment, and vice versa for negative scores.  Because there was no basis for 
interpreting the results for participants who did not support the right to humane treatment, 
only the data for participants who supported the right to humane treatment were used in 
this analysis (n = 172). 
 Part II.  The hypocrisy induction procedure involved showing participants their 
responses for the scenario on which they were most discrepant for Part I.  Therefore, only 
the measures for the scenario on which participants were most discrepant were used in 
tests of the hypotheses for Part II.  Note that, to avoid confusion, I refer to toleration for 
the scenario on which participants were most discrepant during Part I (i.e., before the 
hypocrisy manipulation) as “Part I toleration.”  I refer to toleration for the scenario on 
which participants were most discrepant during Part II (i.e., after the hypocrisy 
manipulation) as “Part II toleration.”  Because the hypocrisy manipulation was not 
expected to be relevant to participants who did not support the right to humane treatment 
in the abstract, only the data for participants who did support the right to humane 
treatment in the abstract were used in the analyses for Part II (n = 172). 
 Hypothesis 6a.  I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right 
to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I 
would become less tolerant of the torture (when asked to respond to the same scenario 
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again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.  
In order to examine changes in toleration, I computed a change score by subtracting Part 
II toleration from Part I toleration.  Positive scores indicated a reduction in toleration 
from Part I to Part II. 
 To test this hypothesis, I used hierarchical multiple regression with changes in 
toleration as the outcome variable, and Part I toleration, condition (hypocrisy or control), 
and the two-way interaction between Part I toleration and condition as the predictor 
variables.  In step one of the analysis, I regressed changes in toleration onto centred Part I 
toleration and condition (Aiken & West, 1991).  In step two, I added the two-way 
interaction for Part I toleration by condition.  Results of significance tests for each of the 
predictor variables in this analysis are reported only for the step in which they are entered 
(e.g., when reporting the significance tests for the main effect of Part I toleration, I report 
results for the first step of the analysis). 
 Hypothesis 6b.  I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right 
to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I 
would be more willing to help the target of the human rights violation (when asked to 
respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they 
were in the control condition.  The results for this hypothesis were analyzed using 
hierarchical multiple regression, with willingness to help the target as the outcome 
variable, and Part I toleration, condition (hypocrisy or control), and the two-way 
interaction between Part I toleration and condition as the predictor variables.  In step one 
of the analysis, I regressed willingness to help the target onto centred Part I toleration and 
condition.  In step two, I added the two-way interaction for Part I toleration by condition.  
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Results of significance tests for each of the predictor variables in this analysis are 
reported only for the step in which they are entered. 
 Hypothesis 6c.  I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right to 
humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would 
be more likely to ask for additional information about supporting human rights if they 
were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.  The dependent 
variable for this hypothesis was binary (i.e., 1 = requested information, 0 = did not 
request information).  For this reason, I tested this hypothesis using hierarchical logistic 
regression, with whether or not participants requested additional information as the 
outcome variable, and Part I toleration, condition (hypocrisy or control), and the two-way 
interaction between Part I toleration and condition as the predictor variables.  In step one 
of the analysis, I regressed whether or not participants asked for additional information 
onto centred Part I toleration and condition.  In step two, I added the two-way interaction 
for Part I toleration by condition. Results of significance tests for each of the predictor 
variables in this analysis are reported only for the step in which they are entered. 
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Results4 
Part I 
 An alpha of .05 is assumed throughout.  Correlations between all variables used in 
Part I can be found in Table 1.  Means and standard deviations for all variables used in 
Part I can be found in Table 2. 
 Preliminary results. 
 Outliers and normality.  I first conducted preliminary analyses on the variables 
that were measured before the hypocrisy manipulation.  These variables were the abstract 
support for human rights items and responses to the scenarios at Part I.  I started by 
screening for outliers.  Z-scores were computed for each of the variables and any scores 
that were greater than |3| were considered outliers.  The only variable for which outliers 
were a concern was the exploratory variable of general attitudes toward human rights.  
This variable had five z-scores in its distribution that were less than -3 (2.23% of the total 
sample).  A closer examination of the distribution of scores indicated that participants 
tended to select only three of the seven values on the response scale for that variable, 
either 5, 6, or 7.  The majority of the sample selected 6 and 7, indicating that most 
participants strongly supported universal human rights (M = 6.92, SD = 0.35).  
Statistically, therefore, participants who selected 5 became outliers.  Because of the lack 
of variability on the general support for human rights variable, it was not used in any 
further analyses. 
                                                
4 Missing data analyses are not mentioned because none of the variables had enough missing data to 
perform said analyses.  Thus, I concluded that there was no reason to be concerned about missing data. 
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Table 2. 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Part I 
 M SD    
Abstract Support for Humane Treatment 5.60 1.69    
Differences in Toleration -0.51 1.24    
Differences in Deservingness -1.02 1.64    
  Moral Reprehensibility  
 Low   High  
 M SD  M SD 
Toleration 2.21 1.35  2.72 1.55 
Perceived Deservingness 2.91 1.53  3.93 1.83 
Perceived Morality 2.93 0.87  2.35 0.94 
Perceived Likelihood 45.34 24.95  53.15 24.39 
Note.  Listwise N = 221 for all means. 
 Next, I checked the distributions for any violations of normality.  Initial 
examination of the Q-Q plots and histograms for each of the variables indicated that there 
were no serious deviations from normality.  I also examined the skewness and kurtosis 
scores for each variable.  I considered skewness and kurtosis scores that were greater than 
|2| to indicate substantial deviations from normality.  None of the variables included in 
my analyses were substantially skewed or kurtotic based on these criteria.  In summary, I 
concluded that the variables were essentially normally distributed. 
 Moral reprehensibility manipulation check.  If the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation was effective, participants should have rated the target and his behaviour as 
more immoral when he had killed children (high moral reprehensibility scenario) 
compared to when he had injured soldiers (low moral reprehensibility scenario).  I 
therefore conducted a paired-samples t test comparing participants’ judgments of 
morality in the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios.  Participants thought the 
target and his behaviour were less moral when he killed children (M = 2.36, SD = 0.95) 
  61 
 
compared to when he injured soldiers (M = 2.92, SD = 0.88), t(222) = 8.470, p < .001,  
d = 0.612.  Thus, the moral reprehensibility manipulation was effective. 
 Tests of hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis 1.  I expected that there would be more toleration of the rights 
violation when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression 
compared to when he had committed a less morally reprehensible transgression.  To test 
this hypothesis, I used a paired-samples t test comparing average toleration ratings for the 
low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios.  Consistent with my hypothesis, 
participants tolerated the torture more when the target had committed a highly morally 
reprehensible transgression (M = 2.73, SD = 1.55) compared to when he had committed a 
less morally reprehensible transgression (M = 2.22, SD = 1.38), t(221) = -5.980, p < .001, 
d = -0.348.5 
 Hypothesis 2.  I expected that the effect of moral reprehensibility would be 
mediated by the extent to which the target of the human rights violation was seen to 
deserve harsh treatment.  To test this hypothesis, I used the method recommended by 
Judd et al. (2001) to examine within-subjects mediation.  For a detailed explanation of 
this method, refer to the information for Hypothesis 2 in the Experimental Design and 
Data Analysis section.  
 For the first step of this method, I tested the effect of the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation (the independent variable) on toleration (the dependent variable).  As noted 
in the test of Hypothesis 1, participants tolerated the torture more for the high, compared 
                                                
5 I tested whether social dominance orientation or right-wing authoritarianism moderated the effect of the 
moral reprehensibility manipulation on the toleration of torture and on perceived deservingness.  Neither 
individual difference variable moderated the effects of moral reprehensibility. 
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to low, moral reprehensibility scenario, indicating that the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation predicted differences in toleration between the two scenarios. 
 For the second step, I used a paired-samples t test to examine the effect of the 
moral reprehensibility manipulation on perceived deservingness (the proposed mediator).    
The t test showed that participants thought the target deserved the torture more when he 
had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression (M = 3.93, SD = 1.83) 
compared to when he had committed a less morally reprehensible transgression  
(M = 2.92, SD = 1.54), t(221) = -9.143, p < .001, d = -0.597.  These results indicated that 
the moral reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in perceived deservingness.   
 In the third step, I used regression to examine whether perceived deservingness 
was related to toleration for each scenario.  For the low moral reprehensibility scenario, 
deservingness significantly predicted toleration, b = 0.557, β = 0.624, t(220) = 11.857,  
p < .001, sr2 = .389.  For the high moral reprehensibility scenario, deservingness also 
significantly predicted toleration, b = 0.519, β = 0.616, t(221) = 11.612, p < .001,  
sr2 = .379.  For both scenarios, the more participants thought the target was deserving of 
harsh treatment, they more they tolerated the use of torture in his interrogation.  For the 
next component of the third step, I used regression to test whether differences in 
perceived deservingness predicted differences in toleration.  Differences in perceived 
deservingness significantly predicted differences in toleration, b = 0.429, β = 0.565,  
t(220) = 10.154, p < .001, sr2 = .319.  The greater the difference in participants’ 
deservingness ratings in the two scenarios, the greater the difference in their toleration 
ratings.  The results from this step indicated that differences in deservingness mediated 
the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on differences in toleration. 
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 For the fourth step, I conducted a final regression analysis to examine whether 
differences in toleration are the result of subject-level differences in perceived 
deservingness.  As described in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section, to 
compute the subject-level differences in perceived deservingness, I added together the 
perceived deservingness scores for both scenarios, and then centred the summed scores.  
Next, I regressed differences in toleration onto differences in perceived deservingness 
and the centred sum for perceived deservingness.  Differences in deservingness continued 
to predict differences in toleration after accounting for subject-level differences in 
deservingness, b = 0.420, β = 0.553, t(219) = 9.749, p < .001, sr2 = .294.  Subject-level 
differences in perceived deservingness did not predict within-subjects differences in 
toleration, b = -0.025, β = -0.059, t(219) = -1.047, p = .296, sr2 = .003, indicating that 
subject-level differences in perceived deservingness did not moderate the effect of the 
moral reprehensibility manipulation.   
 For the final step in testing the within-subjects mediation hypothesis, I examined 
the intercept for the final regression equation.  The intercept in the final regression 
equation for this analysis was not significantly different from 0, b = -0.077,  
t(219) = -0.945, p = .346.  This result indicated that differences in perceived 
deservingness completely mediated the relationship between the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation and toleration. 
In summary, the results of the within-subject mediation analyses supported 
Hypothesis 2, in that perceived deservingness fully mediated the effect of moral 
reprehensibility on toleration.  When the target committed a highly morally reprehensible 
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(vs. less reprehensible) transgression, participants saw him as more deserving of the 
treatment that violated his rights, and, in turn, showed greater toleration for the violation. 
 Hypothesis 3.  I hypothesized that the effect of the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation on the toleration of torture would hold over and above participants’ 
expressed support for the right to humane treatment.  Specifically, I expected that 
participants would still make distinctions in the degree to which they tolerated the use of 
torture based on the moral reprehensibility of the target’s past behaviour, over and above 
the influence of their abstract support for the right to humane treatment.  To examine this 
hypothesis, I followed procedures outlined by Judd et al. (2001) for examining 
moderation of within-subjects effects.  For a detailed explanation of this method, refer to 
the information for Hypothesis 3 in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section. 
 For the first step of this method, I tested the effect of the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation (the independent variable) on toleration (the dependent variable).  As noted 
in the results for Hypothesis 1, participants tolerated the torture more for the high, 
compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario, indicating that the moral 
reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in toleration between the two 
scenarios. 
 For the second and third steps, I used regression to test the main effect of abstract 
support for humane treatment (the individual difference moderator) on toleration, in the 
low and high moral reprehensibility conditions separately.  Support for humane treatment 
significantly predicted toleration for both the low moral reprehensibility scenario,  
b = -0.167, β = -0.204, t(220) = -3.091, p = .002, sr2 = .042, and the high moral 
reprehensibility scenario, b = -0.170, β = -0.185, t(221) = -2.803, p = .006, sr2 = .034.  
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The more participants supported the right to humane treatment, the less they tolerated the 
torture in the scenarios. 
 For the final step in testing Hypothesis 3, I used regression to examine whether 
abstract support for humane treatment interacted with moral reprehensibility to predict 
differences in toleration.  As described in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis 
section, I regressed differences in toleration onto centred scores for support for humane 
treatment.  Support for humane treatment did not significantly predict differences in 
toleration, b < 0.001, β < 0.001, t(220) = 0.006, p = .995, sr2 < .001.  This result indicates 
that abstract support for humane treatment did not moderate the effect of the moral 
reprehensibility manipulation on toleration.   
 In summary, the results of the moderation analyses were consistent with my 
hypothesis.  There was a consistent main effect of abstract support for humane treatment 
on toleration for both scenarios, and differences in toleration were not affected by 
participants’ support for the right to humane treatment (see Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12.  The effect of support for humane treatment on Part I toleration by moral reprehensibility.  The 
slopes of the lines for toleration for the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios based on abstract 
support for humane treatment are parallel, indicating that moderation is not present. 
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Thus, participants did tolerate torture over and above their abstract support for humane 
treatment.  Put another way, participants made distinctions in the extent to which they 
tolerated the torture based on the moral reprehensibility of the target’s past transgression, 
regardless of their abstract support for humane treatment.   
 Hypothesis 4.  I also expected that some participants would show a discrepancy 
between their abstract support for humane treatment and their toleration of human rights 
violations.  Specifically, I expected some participants to tolerate the use of torture in at 
least one of the scenarios despite their abstract support for the right to humane treatment.  
For the purposes of this study, whether or not participants were discrepant was dependent 
on their supporting the right to humane treatment in the first place.  Therefore, in testing 
Hypothesis 4, I only looked at those participants who scored above neutral on the item 
asking about support for the right to humane treatment.  Recall that I defined “discrepant” 
as supporting the right to humane treatment (i.e., scoring above neutral [4] on the item 
asking about the right to humane treatment) and tolerating the use of torture in at least 
one of the scenarios (i.e., scoring at neutral [4] or below on the composite toleration 
measure).  Overall, 50 participants (29.6% of those who supported the right to humane 
treatment) were discrepant in the predicted direction, whereas 119 (70.4%) participants 
were not discrepant.  For the low moral reprehensibility scenario, 22 (13.0%) participants 
were discrepant in the predicted direction, whereas 147 (87.0%) participants were not 
discrepant.  For the high moral reprehensibility scenario, 45 (26.6%) participants were 
discrepant in the predicted direction, whereas 124 (73.4%) participants were not 
discrepant.  In summary, consistent with Hypothesis 4, some participants did show the 
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predicted discrepancy, such that they supported the right to humane treatment in the 
abstract, but tolerated torture in at least one of the torture scenarios.  
 Hypothesis 5.  In addition to expecting some participants to be discrepant (such 
that they would show strong abstract support for humane treatment and tolerate an 
instance of torture), I predicted that the extent to which participants were discrepant 
would be greater for the high, compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario.  To test 
this hypothesis, I conducted a paired-samples t test comparing discrepancy scores for the 
low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios.  Recall that, to compute discrepancy 
scores for this hypothesis, I reverse-scored the toleration composite variables for each 
scenario, and then subtracted the reverse-scored variable from participants’ abstract 
support for humane treatment variable.  This procedure resulted in a continuous measure 
of the degree of discrepancy for the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios.  
 As for Hypothesis 4, I only analyzed data for participants who supported the right 
to humane treatment in the abstract.  Supporting my hypothesis, the t test indicated that 
participants were more discrepant in their support for humane treatment when the target 
had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression (M = 1.00, SD = 1.55) 
compared to a less morally reprehensible transgression (M = 0.49, SD = 1.40),  
t(171) = -5.373, p < .001, d = -0.345.   
 Ancillary analyses.  There were several other variables that I analyzed in order to 
better understand the nature of the effects that I found in my main analyses.  In this 
section, I will present the results of analyses using participants’ perceived likelihood that 
the target of torture was withholding useful information. 
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 Perceived likelihood of having information as an alternate mediator of the 
effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration.  As predicted, perceived deservingness 
mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration of the human rights violation.  
However, participants might have assumed that the target who had engaged in highly 
morally reprehensible past behaviour was more likely to be withholding useful 
information compared to the target who had engaged in less reprehensible behaviour 
(even though the past behaviours were unrelated to the target’s current interrogation).  
Thus, the perceived likelihood that the target was withholding information could have 
been an additional mediator, along with deservingness.  I used the method recommended 
by Judd et al. (2001) to examine the perceived likelihood variable as a within-subjects 
mediator.  For a detailed explanation of this method, refer to the information for 
Hypothesis 2 in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section. 
 For the first step of this method, I tested the effect of the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation (the independent variable) on toleration (the dependent variable).  As noted 
in the results for Hypothesis 1, participants tolerated the torture more for the high, 
compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario, indicating that the moral 
reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in toleration between the two 
scenarios. 
 For the second step, I used a paired-samples t test to examine the effect of the 
moral reprehensibility manipulation on perceived likelihood (the proposed mediator).  
Participants perceived that there was a greater likelihood that the target was withholding 
information about terrorist activities when he had killed children (M = 53.18, SD = 24.33) 
compared to when he had injured soldiers (M = 45.52, SD = 25.04), t(221) = -5.926,  
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p < .001, d = -0.310.  These results indicated that the moral reprehensibility manipulation 
predicted differences in the perceived likelihood measure. 
 For the third step, I used regression to test whether perceived likelihood was 
related to the dependent variable for each scenario.  For the low moral reprehensibility 
scenario, perceived likelihood significantly predicted toleration, b = 0.013, β = 0.244,  
t(219) = 3.730, p < .001, sr2 = .060.  Perceived likelihood also significantly predicted 
toleration in the high moral reprehensibility scenario, b = 0.026, β = 0.413,  
t(220) = 6.730, p < .001, sr2 = .171.  For both scenarios, the more participants perceived 
that the target was likely to be withholding information on terrorist activities, the more 
they tolerated the use of torture in his interrogation.  For the next component of the third 
step, I used regression to test whether differences in perceived likelihood predicted 
differences in toleration.  As was done with the difference scores for toleration and 
deservingness, the difference scores for perceived likelihood of withholding information 
were computed by subtracting the scores for the high moral reprehensibility scenario 
from the scores for the low moral reprehensibility scenario.  Differences in perceived 
likelihood significantly predicted differences in toleration scores, b = 0.020, β = 0.316, 
t(219) = 4.924, p < .001, sr2 = .100, such that the greater the difference in participants’ 
perceived likelihood ratings between the two scenarios, the greater the difference in their 
toleration ratings.  The results from this third step indicated that either full or partial 
mediation is present. 
 For the fourth step, I calculated a final regression equation to examine whether 
differences in toleration are the result of subject-level differences in perceived likelihood.  
To compute the subject-level differences in perceived likelihood, I added together the 
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perceived likelihood scores for both scenarios, and then centred the summed scores.  
Analogous to the test of Hypothesis 2, I next regressed differences in toleration onto 
differences in perceived likelihood and the centred sum for perceived likelihood.  
Differences in perceived likelihood continued to predict differences in toleration after 
accounting for the centred sum for perceived likelihood, b = 0.021, β = 0.322,  
t(218) = 5.115, p < .001, sr2 = .104.  Additionally, the centred sum for perceived 
likelihood significantly predicted differences in toleration scores, b = -0.005, β = -0.193, 
t(218) = -3.067, p = .002, sr2 = .037, indicating that differences in toleration vary as a 
function of the subject-level average of perceived likelihood.  
 For the final step in testing perceived likelihood as a within-subjects mediator, I 
examined the intercept for the final regression equation.  The regression coefficient for 
the intercept was significantly different from 0, b = -0.349, t(218) = -4.143, p < .001, 
indicating that only partial mediation was present.  When the target committed a highly 
morally reprehensible transgression, participants believed he was more likely to be 
withholding useful information and, in turn, they showed greater toleration of his torture. 
 Perceived likelihood and deservingness as co-mediators of the effect of moral 
reprehensibility on toleration.  Although the above analyses show that the perceived 
likelihood variable partially mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on the 
toleration of torture, they do not test whether perceived likelihood mediated this 
relationship in place of or in addition to perceived deservingness.  To test whether 
perceived deservingness and perceived likelihood both mediated the relationship between 
moral reprehensibility and toleration, I regressed differences in toleration onto 
differences in perceived deservingness, differences in perceived likelihood, the centred 
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sum for perceived deservingness, and the centred sum for perceived likelihood.  
Differences in deservingness continued to significantly predicted differences in 
toleration, b = 0.386, β = 0.507, t(216) = 8.207, p < .001, sr2 = .203.  However, 
differences in perceived likelihood no longer significantly predicted differences in 
toleration, b = 0.007, β = 0.106, t(216) = 1.747, p = .082, sr2 = .009.  Thus, the perceived 
likelihood that the target was withholding information did not significantly mediate the 
relationship between moral reprehensibility and toleration after accounting for perceived 
deservingness.  The regression analysis also showed that the regression weight for the 
centred sum for perceived likelihood was still significant, b = -0.005, β = -0.167,  
t(216) = -2.820, p = .005, sr2 = .024, indicating that differences in toleration still varied 
with the subject-level average of perceived likelihood.  The centred sum for 
deservingness was not significant, b = -0.001, β = -0.002, t(216) = -0.026, p = .980,  
sr2 < .001.  Finally, the intercept for this regression equation was not significantly 
different from 0, b = -0.064, t(216) = -0.782, p = .435, indicating that full mediation was 
present. 
In summary, the results of the analyses examining both perceived deservingness 
and perceived likelihood as potential mediators, indicated that deservingness continued to 
fully mediate the relationship between moral reprehensibility and toleration after 
accounting for perceived likelihood.  Additionally, subject-level differences in perceived 
likelihood continued to moderate the relationship between moral reprehensibility and 
toleration after accounting for perceived deservingness.   
 Perceived likelihood of having information as a mediator of the effect of moral 
reprehensibility on deservingness.  One possible explanation for why perceived 
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likelihood was no longer a significant mediator after accounting for deservingness is that 
perceived likelihood mediated the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on 
perceived deservingness.  That is, participants’ tendency to believe that the target who 
engaged in more morally reprehensible behaviour was more likely to possess useful 
information might have led them to see the target as more deserving of harsh treatment.  
To explore whether or not this was the case, I again used the method for within-subject 
mediation described by Judd et al. (2001). 
 For the first step of this method, I tested the effect of the moral reprehensibility 
manipulation (the independent variable) on perceived deservingness (the dependent 
variable).  As described in the section on Hypothesis 2, participants thought the target 
deserved the torture more when he had committed a highly morally reprehensible 
transgression compared to when he had committed a less morally reprehensible 
transgression. 
 For the second step, I examined whether the moral reprehensibility manipulation 
predicted differences in perceived likelihood (the proposed mediator).  As described 
earlier in the Ancillary Analyses section, participants perceived that there was a greater 
likelihood that the target was withholding information about terrorist activities when he 
had killed children compared to when he had injured soldiers. 
 For the third step, I used regression to examine whether perceived likelihood was 
related to perceived deservingness for each scenario.  Perceived likelihood significantly 
predicted perceived deservingness for the low moral reprehensibility scenario, b = 0.022,  
β = 0.364, t(219) = 5.790, p < .001, sr2 = .132, as well as for the high moral 
reprehensibility scenario, b = 0.030, β = 0.392, t(220) = 6.322, p < .001, sr2 = .154.  For 
  73 
 
both scenarios, participants who thought the target was more likely to be withholding 
important information also perceived that he was more deserving of harsh treatment.  For 
the next component of the third step, I regressed differences in deservingness onto 
differences in perceived likelihood.  Differences in perceived likelihood significantly 
predicted differences in deservingness, b = 0.036, β = 0.424, t(219) = 6.919, p < .001,  
sr2 = .180.  The results for this analysis indicated that perceived likelihood either fully or 
partially mediated the relationship between moral reprehensibility and perceived 
deservingness.   
 For the fourth step, I conducted a final regression analysis to examine whether 
subject-level differences in perceived likelihood moderated the effect of moral 
reprehensibility on within-subject differences in perceived deservingness.  I regressed 
differences in deservingness onto differences in perceived likelihood and the centred sum 
for perceived likelihood.  Perceived likelihood continued to mediate the relationship 
between moral reprehensibility and perceived deservingness after accounting for the 
centred sum for perceived likelihood, b = 0.036, β = 0.425, t(218) = 6.936, p < .001,  
sr2 = .425.  The centred sum for perceived likelihood did not significantly predict 
differences in deservingness, b = -0.002, β = -0.050, t(218) = -0.808, p = .420, sr2 = .003.  
Thus, subject-level differences in perceived likelihood did not moderate the relationship 
between moral reprehensibility and deservingness.   
 For the final step, I examined the intercept for the final regression equation.  
Because the regression coefficient for the intercept was still significantly different from 
0, b = -0.740, t(218) = -6.853, p < .001, I can conclude that perceived likelihood only 
partially mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on deservingness. 
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 Summary of analyses for perceived likelihood.  In summary, the results from this 
section indicate that participants believed the target who had committed a highly 
reprehensible transgression was more likely to be withholding useful information 
compared to the target who had committed a less reprehensible transgression.  However, 
perceived deservingness of the target for harsh treatment continued to mediate the effect 
of moral reprehensibility over and above perceived likelihood.  In addition, perceived 
likelihood partially mediated the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on 
perceived deservingness.  Figure 13 shows the conceptual model that is indicated by the 
results of analyses for perceived likelihood. 
 
Figure 13.  The conceptual model indicated by the results of the analyses for perceived likelihood. 
Part II 
 An alpha of .05 is assumed throughout.  Correlations between all variables used in 
Part II can be found in Table 3.  Means and standard deviations for all variables used in 
Part II can be found in Table 4. 
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  Table 3. 
 C
orrelations for Variables in Part II  
 
N
ote.  C
orrelations for the hypocrisy condition are above the diagonal in bold and correlations for the control condition are below
 the diagonal.  Listw
ise N
 = 84 for the 
hypocrisy condition and listw
ise N
 = 80 for the control condition.  H
igh scores indicate greater degrees of the construct. 
*p < .05.  **p < .01.  A
ll tests are tw
o-tailed. 
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Table 4. 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Part II 
  Condition  
 Control   Hypocrisy  
 M SD  M SD 
Abstract Support for Humane Treatment 6.36 0.75  6.46 0.72 
Negative Arousal 2.30 1.13  2.38 1.21 
Toleration (Part I) 2.77 1.47  2.60 1.54 
Toleration (Part II) 1.98 1.25  2.10 1.48 
Changes in Toleration 0.79 1.00  0.50 0.77 
Deservingness (Part I) 3.77 1.88  3.40 2.00 
Deservingness (Part II) 3.12 1.70  2.92 1.94 
Changes in Deservingness 0.65 1.40  0.48 1.21 
Morality (Part I) 2.42 0.92  2.59 0.98 
Morality (Part II) 2.62 1.13  2.68 1.08 
Changes in Morality -0.19 0.66  -0.10 0.79 
Behavioural Intention 3.32 1.71  3.45 1.65 
Note. Listwise N = 84 for the hypocrisy condition and listwise N = 80 for the control condition. 
 Preliminary results. 
 Outliers and normality.  I conducted preliminary analyses for the measures that 
followed the hypocrisy manipulation.  Procedures for identifying outliers and normality 
were similar to those for Part I. 
 Control condition.  Extreme outliers were found on two variables: Part II 
toleration (z = 3.66) and perceived morality measured in Part II (z = 3.89).  The extreme 
outlier for Part II toleration was excluded from all analyses.  Results including this outlier 
are described in footnotes.  Additionally, the outlier for perceived morality in Part II was 
excluded from the relevant ancillary analyses; results including this outlier are described 
in footnotes. 
 Examination of the Q-Q plots, histograms, skewness, and kurtosis scores for each 
of the variables indicated departures from normality for only one variable.  Specifically, 
the kurtosis score for perceived morality for the high moral reprehensibility scenario 
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indicated that the distribution of this variable was leptokurtic (kurtosis = 2.00).  As this 
variable was not used in any of the hypothesis tests, the distribution was not cause for 
concern.   
 Hypocrisy condition.  None of the variables had any extreme outliers.  Thus, all 
scores were used in the analyses.  Examination of the Q-Q plots, histograms, skewness, 
and kurtosis scores for each of the variables indicated no serious deviations from 
normality. 
 Examination of residuals.  Examination of the standardized residuals indicated 
that there were two multivariate outliers (z > |3.00|).  These outliers were excluded from 
all analyses for Part II, but results including these outliers are reported in footnotes.  
Further examination of the residuals indicated that errors were equally distributed across 
predictors. 
 Excluded participants.  There were five participants who did not select the 
correct answer for the question that was used to determine on which scenario they were 
most discrepant.  Participants who selected the wrong answer to this question were 
excluded for two reasons: (1) their response indicates that they might not have been 
paying attention, and (2) those in the hypocrisy condition would have been shown the 
wrong scenario for the second part of the essay task.  Because their error would have 
been a more serious problem for Part II (the hypocrisy induction portion of the study) 
than for Part I of the study, these participants were only excluded from the analyses for 
Part II.  There was also one participant who was excluded due to not following the 
instructions on the essay task for Part II.   
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 Additionally, because the hypocrisy manipulation was only expected to be 
relevant to those who supported the right to humane treatment, participants who reported 
feeling neutral toward or who disagreed with this right (n = 51) were excluded from all 
analyses for Part II.  This exclusion is analogous to the method used by Son Hing et al. 
(2002), where participants who were high in explicit racism were excluded from the 
study because the hypocrisy manipulation was only expected to be relevant to those low 
in explicit racism.   
 Affect manipulation check.6  If dissonance was aroused in the hypocrisy 
condition as intended, then the more participants in that condition tolerated the torture in 
Part I, the more they should have experienced negative arousal after the hypocrisy 
manipulation in Part II.  The same pattern should not occur for participants in the control 
condition.  Thus, I expected a significant interaction between Part I toleration and 
condition on the negative arousal measure.  To test for this interaction, I used hierarchical 
regression with negative arousal as the outcome variable.  Specifically, I regressed 
negative arousal onto Part I toleration and condition in the first step, and the interaction 
between these two predictors in the second step.  There was a significant main effect of 
Part I toleration on negative arousal in the first step of the analysis, b = 0.134, β = 0.172, 
t(162) = 2.224, p = .028, sr2 = .029.  The more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, 
the greater the negative arousal they experienced after the essay task.  The effects for 
condition (p = .613) and the two-way interaction between Part I toleration and condition 
(p = .357) were nonsignificant.  The results suggest that, in both the hypocrisy and 
control conditions, the more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the more they 
experienced dissonance.  I return to this point in the Discussion. 
                                                
6 Inclusion of univariate and multivariate outliers did not substantially affect the results for this analysis.  
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 Tests of hypotheses.7,8 
 Hypothesis 6a.  I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right 
to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I 
would become less tolerant of the torture (when asked to respond to the same scenario 
again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.  
To test this hypothesis, I regressed changes in toleration onto Part I toleration, condition, 
and the interaction between Part I toleration and condition. 
 The regression yielded a significant main effect of Part I toleration on changes in 
toleration, b = 0.259, β = 0.432, t(161) = 6.159, p < .001, sr2 = .186.  The more 
participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the greater the reduction in their toleration from 
Part I to Part II.  There was also a marginally significant main effect of condition on 
changes in toleration, b = -0.240, β = -0.134, t(161) = -1.908, p = .058, sr2 = .018.  
Participants in the control condition showed a greater reduction in their toleration of 
torture from Part I to Part II compared to those in the hypocrisy condition.  The main 
effects were subsumed by a significant interaction between Part I toleration and 
condition, b = -0.208, β = -0.254, t(160) = -2.510, p = .013, sr2 = .030.  Although I 
hypothesized a two-way interaction, further analysis indicated that the pattern of results 
was not as predicted.  I conducted simple slopes analyses for the effect of condition on 
changes in toleration, using -1.68 and 3.65 for low and high Part I toleration, 
respectively.  The slope of the line for those high in Part I toleration was significantly 
different from 0, b = -0.998, β = -0.556, t(160) = 3.059, p = .003, sr2 = .045, as predicted.  
                                                
7 I tested whether individual differences in preference for consistency moderated the effect of the hypocrisy 
induction manipulation on the toleration, behavioural intention, and behavioural dependent variables. None 
of these effects were moderated by preference for consistency. 
8 Inclusion of univariate and multivariate outliers did not substantially affect the results for these analyses.  
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However, those in the control condition reduced their toleration from Part I to Part II to a 
greater extent than those in the hypocrisy condition, a pattern opposite to my hypothesis.  
The slope of the line for those low in Part I toleration was not significantly different from 
0, b = 0.111, β = 0.062, t(160) = 0.594, p = .554, sr2 = .002, as expected (see Figure 14).  
For another perspective, I also conducted simple slopes analyses for the relation between 
Part I toleration and changes in toleration, within the hypocrisy and control conditions.  
The slope for the control condition was significantly different from 0, b = 0.370,  
β = 0.619, t(160) = 6.097, p < .001, sr2 = .176, as was the slope for the hypocrisy 
condition, b = 0.162, β = 0.270, t(160) = 2.883, p = .005, sr2 = .039.  For participants in 
both conditions, the more they tolerated the torture in Part I, the more they reduced their 
toleration from Part I to Part II (see Figure 15).  
 
Figure 14. The effect of condition on changes in toleration moderated by Part I toleration. 
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Figure 15.  The effect of Part I toleration on changes in toleration moderated by condition. 
 Hypothesis 6b.  I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right 
to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I 
would be more willing to help the target of the human rights violation (when asked to 
respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they 
were in the control condition.  To test this hypothesis, I regressed willingness to help the 
target onto Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction between these two predictors. 
 The regression yielded a significant main effect of Part I toleration on willingness 
to help the target, b = -0.430, β = -0.385, t(161) = -5.289, p < .001, sr2 = .147.  The more 
participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the less willing they were to help the target of 
the torture.  The main effect for condition on willingness to help the target was 
nonsignificant, b = 0.062, β = 0.018, t(161) = 0.253, p = .800, sr2 < .001.  Consistent with 
my hypothesis, there was a significant effect of the interaction between Part I toleration 
and condition on willingness to help the target, b = 0.348, β = 0.228, t(160) = 2.158,  
p = .032, sr2 = .024.  I conducted simple slopes analyses for the effect of condition on 
willingness to help the target, using -1.68 and 3.65 for low and high Part I toleration, 
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respectively.  The slope of the line for those high in Part I toleration was significantly 
different from 0, b = 1.328, β = 0.397, t(160) = 2.094, p = .038, sr2 = .023, whereas the 
slope of the line for those low in Part I toleration was not significantly different from 0,  
b = -0.525, β = -0.157, t(160) = -1.446, p = .150, sr2 = .011.  As hypothesized, the 
participants who were high in Part I toleration were more willing to help the target of the 
torture if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition, 
whereas participants who were low in Part I toleration were similarly willing to help the 
target in both conditions (see Figure 16).  For another perspective, I calculated the simple 
slopes for the relation between Part I toleration and willingness to help the target, within 
conditions.  The slope for the control condition was significantly different from 0,  
b = -0.616, β = -0.553, t(160) = -5.220, p < .001, sr2 = .141, as was the slope for the 
hypocrisy condition, b = -0.269, β = -0.241, t(160) = -2.455, p = .015, sr2 = .031.  In both 
conditions, participants were more willing to help the target of the torture the less they 
tolerated the torture in Part I (see Figure 17). 
 
Figure 16. The effect of condition on willingness to help the target moderated by Part I toleration. 
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Figure 17.  The effect of Part I toleration on willingness to help the target moderated by condition.  
 Hypothesis 6c.  I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right to 
humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would 
be more likely to ask for additional information about supporting human rights if they 
were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.  To test this 
hypothesis, I used logistic regression with whether or not participants requested 
additional information as the outcome variable, and Part I toleration, condition, and the 
interaction between these two variables as the predictors.  Results did not confirm my 
hypothesis. 
 The results for the main effects of Part I toleration and condition on whether 
participants asked for additional information can be found in Table 5.  There was a 
significant main effect of condition on whether or not participants requested additional 
information.  Participants were more likely to ask for information if they were in the 
hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.  The effects of Part I 
toleration (p = .338) and the interaction (p = .477) were not significant.  
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Table 5. 
 
Logistic Regression of Likelihood of Asking for Information on Part I Toleration and 
Condition 
  B SE Wald statistic df p eB 
Part I Toleration -0.103 0.107 0.918 1 0.338 0.903 
Condition 0.644 0.322 4.014 1 0.045 1.905 
Note.  The statistics in this table are from the step that included both predictors, but not the interaction. 
 Ancillary analyses.  In this section, I will present the results of tests involving the 
deservingness and perceived morality measures for Part II of the study.  The Part II 
measures of perceived deservingness and morality are those that were administered after 
the hypocrisy manipulation, when participants responded to the torture scenarios a second 
time.  These analyses were conducted to help shed further light on the results for the tests 
of hypotheses for Part II.   
 Changes in perceived deservingness as a mediator of the Part I toleration by 
condition interaction effect on changes in toleration and willingness to help.  The 
following analyses tested whether the interaction effects obtained in tests of Hypotheses 
6a or 6b could be accounted for by changes in perceived deservingness from the first time 
participants responded to the torture scenarios to the second time they responded to these 
scenarios.  To test changes in deservingness as a potential mediator, I used the method 
described by Baron and Kenny (1986) for testing between-subjects mediation (see the 
Experimental Design and Data Analysis section).  First, as for changes in toleration, I 
computed a change score by subtracting Part II deservingness from Part I deservingness.  
Positive scores indicated a reduction in deservingness from Part I to Part II.   
 Changes in toleration.  The first step in examining between-subjects mediation 
establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and 
condition) predicts the dependent variable (changes in toleration).  The results of 
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Hypothesis 6a indicated that the interaction between Part I toleration and condition 
predicted changes in toleration.  
 The second step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the 
independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the 
mediator (changes in perceived deservingness).  To examine this step, I regressed 
changes in perceived deservingness onto Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction.  
In the first step of the regression analysis, Part I toleration significantly predicted changes 
in deservingness, b = 0.138, β = 0.160, t(162) = 2.057, p = .041, sr2 = .026.  The more 
participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the greater the reduction in perceived 
deservingness.  The second and third steps of the regression analysis indicated that 
neither condition nor the interaction significantly predicted changes in deservingness,  
ps > .05.  Thus, changes in perceived deservingness did not mediate the interaction 
between Part I toleration and condition.  
 However, because the main effect for Part I toleration significantly predicted 
changes in deservingness, it was possible that changes in perceived deservingness 
mediated the main effect of Part I toleration on changes in toleration.  As I established in 
the results for Hypothesis 6a, Part I toleration significantly predicted changes in 
toleration (the first step in examining between-subjects mediation).  Additionally, the 
analysis described in the previous paragraph established that Part I toleration significantly 
predicted changes in perceived deservingness (the second step in examining between-
subjects mediation).  The third step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes 
that the mediator (changes in perceived deservingness) predicts the dependent variable 
(changes in toleration).  For this step, I regressed changes in toleration onto changes in 
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perceived deservingness.  Changes in perceived deservingness significantly predicted 
changes in toleration, b = 0.263, β = 0.381, t(162) = 5.241, p < .001, sr2 = .145.  The 
greater the reduction in perceived deservingness, the greater the reduction in toleration. 
 The final step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the effect 
of the independent variable (Part I toleration) on the dependent variable (changes in 
toleration) is no longer significant after accounting for the effect of the mediator (changes 
in perceived deservingness).  For this step, I regressed changes in toleration onto changes 
in perceived deservingness and Part I toleration.  The results of this analysis indicated 
that there was a significant effect on changes in toleration for both changes in 
deservingness, b = 0.220, β = 0.319, t(161) = 4.746, p < .001, sr2 = .099, and Part I 
toleration, b = 0.233, β = 0.388, t(161) = 5.784, p < .001, sr2 = .147.  The results of this 
analysis indicate that changes in perceived deservingness and Part I toleration 
independently predict changes in toleration.  Thus, perceived deservingness did not 
mediate the effect of Part I toleration on changes in toleration.   
 Willingness to help.  The first step in examining between-subjects mediation 
establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and 
condition) predicts the dependent variable (willingness to help).  The results of 
Hypothesis 6b indicated that Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction between Part 
I toleration and condition predicted willingness to help.  
 The second step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the 
independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the 
mediator (changes in perceived deservingness).  The previous section established that 
Part I toleration, but not condition or the interaction, significantly predicted changes in 
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perceived deservingness.  Because the main effect for Part I toleration significantly 
predicted changes in deservingness, it was possible that changes in perceived 
deservingness mediated the main effect of Part I toleration on willingness to help.  As I 
established in the results for Hypothesis 6b, Part I toleration significantly predicted 
willingness to help (the first step in examining between-subjects mediation).  
Additionally, the analysis described in the previous section established that Part I 
toleration significantly predicted changes in perceived deservingness (the second step in 
examining between-subjects mediation).  The third step in examining between-subjects 
mediation establishes that the mediator (changes in perceived deservingness) predicts the 
dependent variable (willingness to help).  For this step, I regressed willingness to help 
onto changes in perceived deservingness.  Changes in perceived deservingness 
significantly predicted willingness to help, b = -0.224, β = -0.175, t(162) = -2.258,  
p = .025, sr2 = .031.  The greater the reduction in perceived deservingness, the less 
willing participants were to help the target. 
 The final step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the effect 
of the independent variable (Part I toleration) on the dependent variable (willingness to 
help) is no longer significant after accounting for the effect of the mediator (changes in 
perceived deservingness).  For this step, I regressed willingness to help onto changes in 
perceived deservingness and Part I toleration.  The results of this analysis indicated that 
changes in perceived deservingness did not significantly predict willingness to help,  
b = -0.149, β = -0.116, t(161) = -1.588, p = .114, sr2 = .013.  Thus, changes in perceived 
deservingness did not mediate the effect of Part I toleration on willingness to help the 
target.  
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 Changes in perceived morality as a mediator of the Part I toleration by 
condition interaction effect on changes in toleration and willingness to help.9  The 
following analyses tested whether any of the results for Hypotheses 6a or 6b could be 
accounted for by changes in perceived morality from the first time participants responded 
to the torture scenarios to the second time they responded to these scenarios.  To test 
changes in perceived morality as a potential mediator, I used the method described by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) for testing between-subjects mediation (see the Experimental 
Design and Data Analysis section).  First, as for changes in toleration, I computed a 
change score by subtracting Part II perceived morality from Part I perceived morality.  
Positive scores indicated a reduction in perceived morality from Part I to Part II.   
 Changes in toleration.  The first step in examining between-subjects mediation 
establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and 
condition) predicts the dependent variable (changes in toleration).  The results of 
Hypothesis 6a indicated that the interaction between Part I toleration and condition 
predicted changes in toleration. 
 The second step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the 
independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the 
mediator (changes in perceived morality).  For this step, I regressed changes in perceived 
morality onto Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction.  Neither of the main effects 
nor the interaction significantly predicted changes in perceived morality, all ps > .05.  
Thus, changes in perceived morality did not mediate the effect of the interaction between 
Part I toleration and condition on changes in toleration. 
                                                
9 Inclusion of the univariate outlier did not substantially affect the results for these analyses. 
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 Willingness to help. The first step in examining between-subjects mediation 
establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and 
condition) predicts the dependent variable (willingness to help).  The results of 
Hypothesis 6b indicated that Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction between Part 
I toleration and condition predicted willingness to help.  However, as was indicated in the 
previous section, the interaction between Part I toleration and condition did not 
significantly predict changes in perceived morality.  Therefore, changes in perceived 
morality did not mediate the effect of the interaction on changes in toleration.  
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Discussion 
 The main goals of my thesis were to (1) examine one reason why people tolerate 
human rights violations and to (2) explore one possible method for reducing this 
toleration.  In the first part of my thesis, I investigated whether people tolerate human 
rights violations on the basis of the target’s perceived deservingness.  In the second part 
of my thesis, I examined whether or not the toleration of human rights violations in 
specific situations can be decreased through hypocrisy induction.  Similar to how the 
previous sections of my thesis have been organized, the discussion of my findings and 
their implications will be presented separately for Parts I and II.  
Part I: The Problem 
 Past research shows that people are motivated to see that they and others get what 
is deserved (e.g., Darley, 2009; Lerner, 1980).  Therefore, similar to Hafer (2011), I 
proposed that people tolerate human rights violations to the extent that they perceive the 
target as deserving of the treatment that violates his or her rights.  Research and theory 
also suggest that people do not take into account contextual factors (like perceived 
deservingness of individuals) when they form abstract opinions (e.g., Batson et al., 1999; 
Finkel, 2001).  Thus, I proposed that some people are willing to tolerate human rights 
violations despite supporting human rights in the abstract.    
 Overall, the results from Part I of my study supported my arguments.  In the 
following paragraphs, I will discuss the results for Hypotheses 1 to 5 as well as the 
potential implications of these findings.  
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 Findings for Hypotheses 1 to 5.   
 Hypothesis 1.  For my first hypothesis, I expected that people would tolerate a 
human rights violation more when the target had committed a highly morally 
reprehensible transgression compared to when the target had committed a less morally 
reprehensible transgression.  My hypothesis was supported.  Participants tolerated a 
man’s torture (a human rights violation) more when he had killed children, a highly 
reprehensible transgression, compared to when he injured soldiers, a less reprehensible 
transgression.  Presumably, in the case of the highly morally reprehensible transgression, 
people saw the human rights violation as retribution for the target’s past behaviour (see 
Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; Liberman, 2013).  Research on retributive motivation indicates 
that people are motivated to see that wrongdoers get their “just deserts”; that 
transgressors receive a negative outcome or punishment that is proportionate to the moral 
reprehensibility of their offense (Darley, 2009).  It is possible that participants were more 
willing to tolerate the violation when the target had killed children because the treatment 
he received was viewed as proportionate to the transgression and, therefore, perceived as 
relatively deserved.  Conversely, when the target committed a less morally reprehensible 
transgression, it is likely that the treatment violating his human rights was seen as less 
proportionate to the transgression and, therefore, was perceived as less deserved.  To 
more directly explore whether participants tolerated the human rights violation based on 
deservingness considerations, I also measured the perceived deservingness of the target 
for harsh treatment.  The results for this variable are discussed next. 
 Hypothesis 2.  For Hypothesis 2, I expected that deservingness would mediate the 
effect of the moral reprehensibility of the target’s past transgression on toleration of the 
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human rights violation.  The results supported my hypothesis.  Perceived deservingness 
fully mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration.  Participants thought the 
target was more deserving of harsh treatment and, in turn, were more willing to tolerate 
his torture when he had killed children compared to when he had injured soldiers.  This 
finding is consistent with research discussed in the previous paragraph suggesting that 
people might tolerate a human rights violation to the extent that the target is seen to 
deserve the treatment.   
 One additional explanation for why participants tolerated the human rights 
violation to a greater extent when the target committed a highly reprehensible 
transgression is that they were more likely to believe that the target had important 
information on terrorist activities.  For example, participants might have thought the 
target who killed children, because he was immoral, was more likely to have been lying 
about not knowing anything.  If people believe that torturing a target might help avoid 
more violence in the future (e.g., avoid a potential terrorist attack) they might be more 
willing to tolerate the human rights violation (Carlsmith & Sood, 2009).   
 For both the high and low moral reprehensibility scenarios in the present study, 
the target claimed not to have any information.  However, participants could still draw 
their own conclusions about whether or not the target had information.  For this reason, I 
also measured how likely participants thought it was that the target was withholding 
important information.  Interestingly, participants thought the target was more likely to be 
withholding information when he had committed the more morally reprehensible 
transgression.  Additionally, the likelihood that the target had information partially 
mediated the relationship between the moral reprehensibility of the target’s transgression 
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and toleration of the human rights violation.  These results suggest that participants had 
both utilitarian as well as retributive reasons for greater toleration of torture for the target 
who had engaged in the more reprehensible past transgression.  However, after 
accounting for perceived deservingness judgments, the likelihood of the target having 
information was no longer a significant mediator.  Rather, further analyses indicated that 
the perceived likelihood that the target had information mediated the relationship 
between the moral reprehensibility of the target’s past transgression and the target’s 
perceived deservingness for harsh treatment.  The greater the moral reprehensibility of 
the target’s past transgression, the more participants thought he was likely to be 
withholding information and, in turn, the more participants thought he deserved harsh 
treatment.  Therefore, it appears that what seemed to be utilitarian reasons for greater 
toleration of torture were in fact driven by a desire to see the target receive his just 
desserts.  
 I was also interested in the role of participants’ abstract attitudes toward the right 
being violated.  It was possible that moral reprehensibility would predict toleration even 
after accounting for participants’ abstract attitudes toward the human right being violated.  
The test of this hypothesis is discussed next.   
 Hypothesis 3.  For Hypothesis 3, I expected that people’s tendency to tolerate the 
human rights violation as a function of the moral reprehensibility of the target’s past 
transgression would hold over and above their previously reported attitudes toward 
humane treatment.  This hypothesis was supported.  The results showed that, although 
participants did tolerate the violation less the more they supported the right to humane 
treatment in the abstract, they tolerated the torture more in the high, compared to low, 
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moral reprehensibility scenario regardless of their abstract support for the right to humane 
treatment. 
 One explanation for this finding is that some people find it very difficult to ignore 
deservingness-related information.  Research and theory on equity theory (Adams, 1965), 
belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), and retributive justice (Darley, 2009) suggest that 
people have a strong motivation to see that individuals get what is deserved.  Moreover, 
concerns about deservingness seem to be so ingrained that judgments about what is 
deserved might even be automatic (see Callan, Sutton, & Dovale, 2010; van den Bos, 
Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006).  The automatic nature of deservingness judgments 
might mean that some people are unable to ignore deservingness-related information 
when responding to certain situations.  In the context of the current thesis, even though 
many individuals believe that no one should ever be tortured, the deservingness-related 
aspects of a situation in which the right to protection against torture is violated might lead 
people to still tolerate torture in that instance. 
 This inability to ignore deservingness factors suggests that some people might 
show a discrepancy, supporting a human right in the abstract yet tolerating the violation 
of that right in certain situations.  I address this issue in my discussion of Hypothesis 4. 
 Hypothesis 4.  For Hypothesis 4, I expected that at least some people would show 
a discrepancy between their abstract attitudes toward human rights and their toleration of 
a human rights violation.  Specifically, I expected that some people would support the 
right to humane treatment, but tolerate a violation of that right in at least one situation.  
My results supported this hypothesis.  About 30% of participants who expressed support 
for the right to protection against torture and inhumane treatment were still willing to 
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tolerate a case of torture.  Thus, having supportive attitudes toward a particular human 
right does not mean that an individual will not tolerate a violation of that right.  If there is 
reason to believe that the target of a human rights violation deserved the treatment, then 
some people who support human rights in the abstract might still tolerate the human 
rights violation (see Staerklé & Clémence, 2004).  However, simply observing that some 
participants were discrepant does not necessarily mean that they were discrepant due to 
deservingness considerations.  Hypothesis 5 addressed this issue.  
 Hypothesis 5.  I examined whether or not the discrepancy described in the 
previous section was greater when the target had committed a highly morally 
reprehensible transgression compared to a less reprehensible transgression (Hypothesis 
5).  Indeed, people were discrepant to a greater degree when the target had done 
something highly morally reprehensible in his past.  This finding indicates that people 
who otherwise support a particular human right in the abstract might tolerate a violation 
of that right if there is sufficient reason to believe that the target deserved the treatment.   
 Implications of Hypotheses 1 to 5.  The results from Part I of my thesis confirm 
previous findings that people are willing to tolerate or endorse human rights violations as 
a function of the reprehensibility of the target’s behaviour (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; 
Liberman, 2013; Staerklé & Clémence, 2004).  The results of my study also add to this 
literature by showing direct evidence of one mechanism through which reprehensibility 
affects toleration; namely, the perceived deservingness of the target for the treatment that 
violates the right.  People appear to make distinctions about whether or not a human 
rights violation is acceptable, and these distinctions are based in part on whether or not 
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the target is believed to deserve the treatment that violates his or her rights.  Although 
this mechanism has been assumed in some past research, it has never been tested directly. 
 That people make deservingness-based distinctions about when a human rights 
violation is acceptable contrasts with existing procedural justice theories on what 
constitutes fair treatment.  In the procedural justice literature, theorists have proposed that 
treating people politely and with respect is perceived as fair because such treatment 
makes the target feel like a valued member of the group (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler 
& Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992).  Importantly, polite and respectful treatment, 
according to these theories, should be fair regardless of any individuating characteristics.  
However, procedural justice theories fail to take into account perceptions of 
deservingness and how these judgments might influence people’s perceptions of 
procedural fairness.  Treating people politely and with respect might only be seen as fair 
to the extent that the target is perceived to deserve such treatment.  Research by Heuer, 
Blumenthal, Douglas, and Weinblatt (1999) supports this claim.  Human rights violations 
are an extreme example of disrespectful or negative treatment.  The results of the current 
study therefore add to Heuer et al.’s argument that procedural justice theorists should take 
perceived deservingness into account when making predictions about what treatment 
people believe is fair.  
 Not only do the findings of Part I of my thesis have implications for theories of 
procedural justice, they also have implications for preventing and reducing the toleration 
of human rights violations.  The UDHR outlines fundamental rights (United Nations, 
2014a).  Tolerating the violation of these rights in some situations undermines a basic and 
crucial component of human rights; that they are universal and, thus, granted to everyone 
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without exception (United Nations, 2014a).  Despite that these rights are supposed to be 
granted to everyone, the results of my thesis show that even people who endorse those 
rights do not necessarily treat them as universal, in that they will tolerate specific cases of 
human rights violations.  These findings suggest one way to reduce toleration of human 
rights violations, at least among people who endorse universal human rights in the 
abstract.  Specifically, people who endorse a particular right in an abstract sense could be 
made aware that their toleration of a particular human rights violation is discrepant from 
their abstract attitude.  Under these conditions, people might recognize that their 
toleration of the human rights violation was hypocritical, leading them to reduce their 
toleration of the violation.  In the second part of my thesis, I tested whether “inducing 
hypocrisy” is effective in changing how people respond to human rights violations.   
Part II: A Possible Solution 
 For Part II of my thesis, I examined one potential method for reducing the 
toleration of a human rights violation.  I attempted to induce hypocrisy in order to have 
participants realize that there was a discrepancy between their abstract support for human 
rights and their responses to human rights violations in specific situations.  Similar to 
previous hypocrisy induction studies (e.g., Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1997), I 
first had participants advocate support for human rights, then I exposed those in the 
hypocrisy induction condition to the discrepancy between the abstract position they just 
advocated and their situation-specific responses to a human rights violation (from Part I).  
Finally, I gave participants the opportunity to change their previous responses to a human 
rights violation, allowing them to make their situation-specific response more consistent 
with the position they had advocated.  I also assessed how willing participants were to 
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help the target of the violation and to seek out further information on supporting human 
rights.  The results from this experiment indicated that participants did not respond to the 
procedure entirely as expected.  In the next few sections, I will discuss the findings for 
Hypotheses 6a to 6c, as well as the potential implications of these findings. 
 Findings for Hypotheses 6a to 6c.  The hypocrisy induction procedure is 
designed to change attitudes and/or behaviour by inducing a state of negative arousal 
(i.e., psychological dissonance) in people who have behaved hypocritically in the past; 
that is, people who have behaved in a way that is discrepant from their abstract attitude 
on an issue.  Thus, I expected participants in the hypocrisy condition to feel more 
negative arousal the more they tolerated the torture in Part I, because greater toleration 
meant participants were more discrepant from their previously stated, abstract support for 
the right not to be tortured.  The relation between negative arousal and Part I toleration 
should not have occurred in the control group, where participants were not made to focus 
on their potentially discrepant reactions to the target’s torture.  The results of the analyses 
for the affect measure did not show the expected effect.  Rather, the more participants 
tolerated the torture in Part I, the greater negative arousal they experienced, regardless of 
condition.  This finding suggests that dissonance was aroused for discrepant individuals 
in both conditions, rather than in only the hypocrisy condition. 
 A possible reason that dissonance might have been aroused in both conditions is 
that participants responded to the torture scenarios just before writing the essays in 
support of the right to humane treatment.  The essay task might have reminded 
participants in both conditions of their reactions to the torture in Part I.  Therefore, in 
both conditions, participants who had been hypocritical might have been focussed on 
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their hypocritical reactions.  The results for Hypotheses 6a to 6c are interpreted in light of 
this explanation for the affect results.  
 Hypothesis 6a.  I expected that, among participants who supported the right to 
humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would 
become less tolerant of the torture (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if 
they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.  Although 
there was a significant two-way interaction between Part I toleration and condition, the 
effect was in the opposite direction from my prediction.  Of those participants who 
tolerated the torture in Part I, the participants in the control condition actually showed a 
greater reduction in their toleration than those in the hypocrisy condition. 
 One possible explanation for these results is that there was a consistency effect.  
Participants might have been motivated to be consistent with their previous responses to 
the scenarios when asked to respond again.  Furthermore, participants in the hypocrisy 
condition were perhaps more able to be consistent because they had just been shown their 
answers for Part I.  As a result, participants in the hypocrisy condition showed less 
change in their toleration of torture from Part I to Part II, compared to participants in the 
control condition. 
 Although a consistency bias might partially account for the findings regarding 
change in toleration, other results suggest that consistency bias is not the entire 
explanation.  Several of the findings suggest that dissonance arising from hypocrisy 
induction might have played a role in reduced toleration of the target’s torture.  The more 
participants tolerated the torture the first time they responded to the scenarios (i.e., the 
more participants were discrepant or hypocritical) the more their toleration was reduced 
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the second time they responded to the scenarios.  Also, the manipulation check results for 
the affect measure suggest that, the more participants tolerated the torture the first time 
they responded to the scenarios, the more dissonance they felt.  Therefore, perhaps the 
reduction in toleration for hypocritical individuals was at least in part due to dissonance 
brought on by focussing on their hypocritical reactions (as a result of the writing task in 
both conditions). 
 It is interesting to note that the main effect for the degree to which participants 
tolerated the torture in Part I occurred for both changes in toleration of the torture and 
changes in perceived deservingness of the target for harsh treatment.  That is, discrepant 
participants seemed to become less convinced that the target was deserving of harsh 
treatment and less tolerant of his torture, regardless of condition.  However, the changes 
in perceived deservingness did not mediate the effect of Part I toleration on changes in 
toleration.  This finding implies that the effect of Part I toleration was independent of 
changes in deservingness.  Moreover, the results of the ancillary analyses for perceived 
morality indicated that the changes in toleration, as well as in deservingness, occurred 
without similar changes in perceptions of the target’s morality.  Participants were able to 
perceive the target as less deserving of torture and to tolerate the torture less than in Part 
I, but without also seeing him as more moral than in Part I.  Taken together, these results 
imply that deservingness and toleration judgments can operate independent of 
perceptions of the target’s morality.  In addition, these results imply that people’s motives 
for reducing their toleration of torture are based, at least in part, on factors that are 
independent of perceptions of the target’s morality or deservingness. 
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 I have argued in this section that the relation between Part I toleration of torture 
and reduction in toleration between Part I and Part II could have resulted in part from 
psychological dissonance arising from hypocrisy induction.  However, this finding could 
also reflect a floor effect.  Specifically, participants who tolerated the torture less in Part I 
did not have as much room on the scale to be able to reduce their toleration.  Toleration 
was measured on a scale from 1 (low toleration) to 7 (high toleration).  For the 29.6% of 
participants who both tolerated the torture and supported humane treatment in the 
abstract, the mean toleration for Part I was 4.67 (SD = 0.66).  Because this mean was near 
the middle of the scale, there was plenty of room for participants to reduce their toleration 
when they responded to the scenario again in Part II.  However, for participants who 
supported the right to humane treatment in the abstract and did not tolerate the torture in 
Part I, the mean toleration for Part I was 1.91 (SD = 0.89).  Given that this mean is near 
the low endpoint of the scale, these participants had very little room to reduce their 
toleration when responding to the scenario again in Part II.  Thus, there could have been a 
floor effect for Part II toleration for those who were low in Part I toleration.  
 The possible combination of hypocrisy, floor, and consistency effects makes the 
results for change in toleration difficult to interpret.  However, participants only 
responded to the items regarding their willingness to help the target once, after the 
hypocrisy manipulation.  Therefore, the results for Hypothesis 6b should not have been 
susceptible to the same consistency problems as the results for Hypothesis 6a.  
Furthermore, the scores on the willingness to help composite were not as close to the end 
of the response scale as were the scores for Part I toleration.  Thus, floor effects can also 
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be ruled out.  For these reasons, the results for Hypothesis 6b are a better indicator of the 
effectiveness of the hypocrisy induction procedure than the results for Hypothesis 6a. 
 Hypothesis 6b.  I expected that, among participants who supported the right to 
humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would 
be more willing to help the target of the human rights violation (when asked to respond to 
the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the 
control condition.  The results supported my hypothesis. 
 Although I found the predicted interaction, the affect results caused me to 
question whether the underlying reason for the pattern of results was as I had originally 
proposed.  The affect results suggested that, in both conditions, the more participants 
tolerated the torture in Part I, the more they experienced hypocrisy-related dissonance.  If 
this was the case, and dissonance increased hypocritical participants’ willingness to help 
the target of torture, then the more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the more 
they should have been willing to help the target of torture, regardless of condition.  
However, the relation between Part I toleration and willingness to help occurred only for 
participants in the hypocrisy condition, not the control condition.  
 One possible explanation for these results is that participants in the control 
condition, because attention was not drawn to their hypocrisy, were not as motivated to 
compensate for their discrepant behaviour.  When it is not clear that someone else has 
noticed the hypocrisy, participants might not want to draw attention to their previously 
hypocritical behaviour by compensating for it (Gaffney, Hogg, Cooper, & Stone, 2012).  
In the hypocrisy condition for the present study, participants were shown their 
hypocritical responses from Part I, possibly indicating to them that their hypocrisy had 
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been noticed (by the experimenter) and motivating them to compensate for their 
hypocrisy.  Because participants in the control condition were not shown their responses, 
they might have had the impression that their hypocrisy went unnoticed, making them 
less motivated to compensate for the hypocrisy.  This interpretation of the findings for 
Hypothesis 6b suggests that participants might be more motivated to reduce their 
hypocritical toleration of a human rights violation if they believe that others have noticed 
their hypocrisy. 
 Finally, the ancillary analyses regarding changes in participants’ perceptions that 
the target deserved harsh treatment and their perceptions of the morality of the target are 
interesting in light of the above effects for willingness to help the target.  The ancillary 
analyses suggest that any hypocrisy-induced effect that occurred on participants’ 
willingness to help the target was not mediated by changes in these perceptions (see the 
discussion for Hypothesis 6a). 
 In addition to looking at whether participants intended to behave in support of 
human rights (in this case, by helping a target of torture), it was also important to look at 
whether or not they actually behaved in support of human rights.  Although people’s 
intentions to behave a certain way are important in determining how they actually 
behave, these intentions do not always lead to corresponding behaviour (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975).  For this reason, I also looked at the effect of the hypocrisy manipulation 
on participants’ behaviour in relation to human rights. 
 Hypothesis 6c.  I expected that, among participants who supported the right to 
humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would 
be more likely to ask for additional information about supporting human rights if they 
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were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.  The results of 
the test of this hypothesis were not consistent with my prediction, nor were they similar 
to the findings from tests of Hypotheses 6a and 6b.  Participants were more likely to ask 
for information about supporting human rights in the hypocrisy condition, but this did not 
differ based on their toleration of torture in Part I. 
 One possible explanation for these results is that participants were more likely to 
ask for additional information in the hypocrisy condition because they were asked to 
think about human rights more than were participants in the control condition.  
Specifically, participants in the hypocrisy condition wrote an additional part of the essay, 
therefore, they would have been focusing on human rights for a longer period of time 
than participants in the control condition, who only wrote the first part of the essay.  It is 
possible that having participants in the hypocrisy condition elaborate more on why it is 
important to support human rights made them more interested in or curious about 
universal human rights, which increased how likely they were to ask for additional 
information on supporting human rights. 
 The results for this hypothesis might indicate that having people reflect on the 
importance of human rights for a longer period of time makes them more likely to act in 
support of universal human rights.  However, given that these results are not consistent 
with any of the other results for Part II, they should be interpreted with caution. 
 Implications of Hypotheses 6a to 6c.  With respect to the hypocrisy induction 
literature, the results of the current study suggest that certain procedures will be less 
likely to show unambiguous evidence of hypocrisy induction effects.  For example, it is 
important to leave enough time between people’s initial hypocritical responses and the 
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hypocrisy induction procedure to avoid the consistency effects that might have been at 
play in the current study.  Past studies on hypocrisy induction did not have participants 
committing the hypocritical behaviour directly before the hypocrisy induction procedure 
(e.g., Son Hing et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1997), which is likely why problems with 
consistency effects have not been previously reported in this literature.  In addition, a 
relatively long period of time between participants’ hypocritical behaviours and the 
hypocrisy manipulation will help ensure that hypocrisy is not inadvertently induced in the 
control group, as appears to have been the case in the present study. 
 Despite some ambiguous and inconsistent results, the findings as a whole suggest 
that hypocrisy induction might be effective for encouraging people to respond to human 
rights violations in a way that is consistent with their abstract support for the given right.  
Assuming that some of the findings in Part II were due to hypocrisy induction, the results 
could also have important implications for how such initiatives aimed at reducing 
toleration of human rights violations are implemented.  For example, the results suggest 
that drawing attention to people’s hypocrisy might be necessary to motivate people to 
compensate for their hypocrisy by responding in a way that supports their abstract 
endorsement of human rights.  People’s motivation might be heightened under these 
conditions because they believe that others have noticed their discrepant responses.   
 Another practical implication of the findings for Part II is that decreased toleration 
of human rights violations might occur independent of changes in the perceived 
deservingness of the target for treatment that violates his or her rights.  Similarly, 
decreased toleration of human rights might occur independent of people’s views on the 
morality of the target and his or her behaviour.  Thus, techniques aimed at reducing 
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toleration of human rights violations do not necessarily have to convince people that 
targets of rights violations are good people or deserve good treatment. 
 Finally, there was more evidence that hypocrisy induction was effective for the 
measures of toleration and willingness to help the target of the human rights violation 
than there was for the behaviour measure.  These findings imply that attempts to 
influence responses to human rights violations, even if effective, might not lead to similar 
behaviours supporting human rights.  Theories of the link between social justice attitudes 
and social action (e.g., van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004) will be helpful in 
addressing this issue in further research.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current study had a few limitations that should be noted when considering the 
implications of the results. It is important to note, for example, that the sample for the 
current study was overwhelmingly female (approximately 88%).  Although sex 
differences have not been noted in similar studies (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009), it 
would be useful to replicate the current findings using a more representative sample. 
 Additionally, the scenarios about human rights focused on one specific human 
rights violation (i.e., torture).  It is unclear whether my results for Part I could be 
generalized to other types of human rights violations.  The right to humane treatment was 
used in the current study because responses to violations of this right were expected to be 
particularly relevant to deservingness.  It is possible, though, that deservingness would 
not be considered for violations of other rights outlined in the UDHR (United Nations, 
2014a).  For example, deservingness might be less relevant when people make judgments 
about specific violations of women’s right to education.  Future research on reactions to 
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human rights violations should explore whether the same pattern of results is found for 
violations of human rights other than the protection against torture. 
 Other contextual factors related to how the violation was depicted in the scenario 
might make it difficult to generalize to other instances of human rights violations.  
Canadian participants read about an Afghani man who had previous ties to extremist 
groups.  Responses might have differed if participants had read about someone with a 
similar nationality or someone who did not have ties to extremist groups; both of these 
characteristics could influence factors such as dehumanization (Newheiser, Sawaoka, & 
Dovidio, 2012).  If the target is dehumanized, then people might more readily believe that 
the target is deserving of negative treatment, such as torture.  Future studies could explore 
how information about the similarity or dissimilarity of the target affects the relationship 
between deservingness considerations and toleration.   
 A few limitations are specific to Part II of the current study.  As mentioned 
earlier, dissonance appeared to be aroused in both the hypocrisy and control conditions, 
likely due to the short period of time between participants’ hypocritical responses and the 
essay task.  Future research could solve this problem by running the study over two 
sessions, separated by several days.  In the first session, participants would rate their 
abstract support for a particular human right and respond to specific violations of that 
right.  Participants who supported the human right in the abstract would be called back to 
the second session, in which they would be randomly assigned to a hypocrisy induction 
or control condition.  
 The results of the current study suggest that people can be induced to decrease 
their toleration of human rights violations independent of deservingness considerations.  
  108 
 
Future research could explore methods that directly attempt to decrease people’s 
tendency to focus on deservingness considerations, methods that reach even those who 
are opposed to certain human rights in the abstract.  One potential method, as suggested 
by Hafer (2011), would be to encourage people to focus on “entitlement” rather than on 
“deservingness,” where entitlement is based on adherence to formal or informal rules 
rather than contextual factors (Feather, 2003).  For example, people could be persuaded 
that, although an individual seems deserving of treatment that violates his or her rights, 
she or he is nevertheless entitled to those rights as a function of a formal human rights 
code.  Strengthening social norms associated with entitlement to universal human rights 
would help people put concern for entitlement ahead of deservingness considerations.  
One way to increase the sense that entitlement to universal human rights is normative is 
to make people more aware of international human rights law, which suggests that most 
countries are in favour of such entitlements. 
 Additionally, it is possible that, regardless of the method, getting people to reduce 
their toleration of human rights violations could eventually lead to changes on an 
international level.  If people are motivated to act in support of universal human rights, 
then it is likely that they will push their leaders also to act in support of human rights.  It 
is important to note that, at this time, not all countries have ratified all of the rights 
outlined in the UDHR (United Nations, 2014b).  Public pressure on leaders, from their 
own citizens, to act in support of human rights could increase leaders’ willingness to 
ratify and endorse the rights outlined in the UDHR.  
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General Conclusions 
 Overall, the results of the current study indicate that people tolerate human rights 
violations on the basis of deservingness.  Moreover, toleration based on deservingness 
occurs over and above, and even in opposition to, people’s abstract support for human 
rights.  It is possible that a procedure similar to hypocrisy induction might help reduce 
this toleration of human rights violations.  The current findings suggest that such 
initiatives might be particularly effective if they draw attention to people’s hypocritical 
toleration of human rights violations, perhaps because people will feel that others have 
noticed their hypocritical toleration. 
Unfortunately, despite a generally positive attitude toward universal human rights, 
many individuals still tolerate specific violations of these rights.  Although much more 
work is needed, the current study is an initial step in addressing this important issue. 
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APPENDIX A: Informed Consent Letters 
[Letter for the First Study] 
 
Date: October 2013 
Project Title: Personal Opinions about Current Events 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Carolyn Hafer, Professor of Social Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 4297; chafer@brocku.ca 
 
Student Principal Investigator: Caroline Drolet, MA candidate 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
cd11da@brocku.ca 
 
INVITATION 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate people’s opinions on a variety of general topics, as well as their reactions to specific 
news stories.  
 
WHAT’S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to rate several statements related to your opinions of people, 
the world in general, and various social issues.  Additionally, you will be asked to read a few 
summaries of news stories and then respond to several questions about what you read.  
Participation will take approximately 30 minutes of your time. 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Possible benefits of participation include a first-hand experience of what social science research 
involves for the participants. The researchers will also benefit from a more complete 
understanding of how people look at and react to certain social issues. There also may be risks 
associated with participation, as you might be uncomfortable with the situation presented in the 
new stories. Please note that such emotional discomfort is expected to be no more than that 
experienced by reading a newspaper or watching news on television.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included with your 
responses or in any other way associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, 
because our interest is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be 
identified individually in any way in written reports of this research. Data collected during this 
study will be stored indefinitely on a computer in the social psychology laboratory at Brock 
University. Access to these data will be restricted to Dr. Carolyn Hafer and her colleagues, as 
well as her research students at Brock University. 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or 
participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at 
any time and may do so without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Please 
note that once the questionnaires are completed they are anonymous and therefore impossible to 
remove from the data should you wish to withdraw after completing your participation. 
 
  121 
 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. 
Feedback about this study will be available after September 2014. Participants who wish to 
receive information about the findings of this study at that time can e-mail chafer@brocku.ca or 
cd11da@brocku.ca. 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Dr. 
Carolyn Hafer or Caroline Drolet using the contact information provided above. This study has 
been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock 
University [insert file #]. If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research 
participant, please contact the Brock University Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 
3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
 
CONSENT 
I agree to participate in this study described above for 30 minutes of research credit. I have made 
this decision based on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the 
opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or 
the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at 
any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am finished. Sign below if you agree to 
participate in the study. 
 
 
Name (printed) Signature Date 
 
 
 
[The researcher will keep this portion and participants will keep the rest of the form.] 
 
CONSENT 
I agree to participate in this study described above for 30 minutes of research credit. I have made 
this decision based on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the 
opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or 
the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at 
any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am finished. Sign below if you agree to 
participate in the study. 
 
 
Name (printed) Signature Date 
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[Letter for the Second Study] 
 
Date: October 2014 
Project Title: Emotions and Persuasive Writing Style 
Principal Investigator:  Dr. Carolyn Hafer, Professor of Social Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 4297; chafer@brocku.ca 
 
INVITATION 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate the link between people’s emotions and their ability to write persuasively on a variety 
of general topics.  
 
WHAT’S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to write a persuasive essay on one of several topics.  
Additionally, you will be asked to rate the extent to which various characteristics apply to you.  
Participation will take approximately 30 minutes of your time. 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Possible benefits of participation include a first-hand experience of what social science research 
involves for the participants. The researchers will also benefit from a more complete 
understanding of how people think about human rights and why it is important to support them. 
There are no expected risks associated with completing this task. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included with your 
responses or in any other way associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, 
because our interest is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be 
identified individually in any way in written reports of this research. Data collected during this 
study will be stored indefinitely on a computer in the social psychology laboratory at Brock 
University. Access to these data will be restricted to Dr. Carolyn Hafer and her colleagues, as 
well as her research students at Brock University. 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or 
participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at 
any time and may do so without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Please 
note that once the questionnaires are completed they are anonymous and therefore impossible to 
remove from the data should you wish to withdraw after completing your participation. 
 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. 
Feedback about this study will be available after September 2014. Participants who wish to 
receive information about the findings of this study at that time can e-mail chafer@brocku.ca. 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Dr. 
Carolyn Hafer using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and 
received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University [insert file #]. If 
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you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the 
Brock University Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
 
CONSENT 
I agree to participate in this study described above for 30 minutes of research credit. I have made 
this decision based on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the 
opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or 
the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at 
any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am finished. Sign below if you agree to 
participate in the study. 
 
 
Name (printed) Signature Date 
 
 
 
[The researcher will keep this portion and participants will keep the rest of the form.] 
 
CONSENT 
I agree to participate in this study described above for 30 minutes of research credit. I have made 
this decision based on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the 
opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or 
the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at 
any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am finished. Sign below if you agree to 
participate in the study. 
 
 
Name (printed) Signature Date 
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APPENDIX B: Participant ID and Demographic Information 
 
This is your Participant ID for this study  {random ID shown here} 
 
What is your sex?  __________________________ 
 
What is your age in years?  __________________________ 
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APPENDIX C: Short Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale and Human Rights Items 
 
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree.  For each 
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by selecting a number 
on the scale that is provided.  Please remember that your first responses are usually the most 
accurate. 
 
Please answer the next few items using the scale below. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
 
______ Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
______ Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt 
every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
______ There are many radical, immoral people in our country today who are trying to ruin it 
for their godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
______ Human rights should be universal, meaning they are granted to everyone (e.g., 
regardless of race, gender, behaviour, sexual orientation). HR 
______ Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away 
at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
______ The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be 
justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 
______ Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even 
if it makes them different from everyone else. 
______ People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of 
religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral 
and immoral. 
______ The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers 
spreading bad ideas. 
______ No one should ever be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment for any reason. HR 
______ There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. 
______ What our country really needs, instead of more “civil rights” is a good, stiff dose of law 
and order. 
______ Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, 
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way” things are supposed to be done. 
______ The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show that we 
have to crack down harder on deviant groups and trouble-makers if we are going to save 
our moral standards and preserve law and order. 
 
 
HR indicates a human rights related item. 
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APPENDIX D: Social Dominance Orientation Scale 
 
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree.  For each 
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by selecting a number 
on the scale that is provided.  Please remember that your first responses are usually the most 
accurate. 
 
Please answer the next few items using the scale below. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
 
______ Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
______ In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
______ It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
______ To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
______ If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
______ It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
______ Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
______ Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
______ It would be good if groups could be equal. 
______ Group equality should be our ideal. 
______ All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
______ We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
______ Increased social equality. 
______ We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. 
______ We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. 
______ No one group should dominate in society. 
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APPENDIX E: Preference for Consistency Scale 
 
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree.  For each 
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by using the scale that is 
provided.  Please remember that your first responses are usually the most accurate 
 
Please answer the next few items using the scale below. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly  
Disagree 
   Neutral    Strongly 
Agree 
 
______ I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate. 
______ It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs. 
______ Even if my attitudes and actions seemed consistent with one another to me, it would 
bother me if they did not seem consistent in the eyes of others. 
______ It is important to me that those who know me can predict what I will do. 
______ I want to be described by others as a stable, predictable person. 
______ Admirable people are consistent and predictable. 
______ The appearance of consistency is an important part of the image I present to the world. 
______ It bothers me when someone I depend on is unpredictable. 
______ I don’t like to appear as if I am inconsistent. 
______ I get uncomfortable when I find my behaviour contradicts my beliefs.  
______ An important requirement for any friend of mine is personal consistency.  
______ I typically prefer to do things the same way.  
______ I dislike people who are constantly changing their opinions.  
______ I want my close friends to be predictable.  
______ It is important to me that others view me as a stable person.  
______ I make an effort to appear consistent to others.  
______ I’m uncomfortable holding two beliefs that are inconsistent.  
______ It doesn’t bother me much if my actions are inconsistent. 
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APPENDIX F: Scenarios  
[Instructions] 
We are interested in how people respond to different types of current events. We have written 
brief summaries of many different kinds of current events based on actual news stories. You will 
read 6 of these. 
 
In your case, in order to give you a broad range of stories, two of the stories are about forest 
fires, two are about car accidents, and two are about interrogations in Afghanistan. 
 
Please read each story carefully as you will be asked to answer some questions about what 
happened. 
 
[Torture with Minor Transgression Scenario] 
Topic of the Story: Interrogation 
Person Described: Ahmad Farid 
Farid was detained on suspicion of having information about terrorist activities. He was captured 
while tending goats in close proximity to a Taliban camp. It was later discovered that during his 
teen years Farid was a member of an extremist Muslim group for three years, starting in 2005. 
During this time, Farid was involved in an ambush that left four Canadian army soldiers with 
minor injuries. He had not been in contact with the group responsible for the ambush for a few 
years prior to his recent detainment. Despite that Farid has repeatedly said that he does not know 
any useful information about nearby terrorist groups, he was believed to have overheard useful 
information and was interrogated based on this assumption. During the interrogation, he was 
tortured and, as a result, was left with lasting physical and emotional scars. 
 
[Torture with Serious Transgression Scenario] 
Topic of the Story: Interrogation 
Person Described: Yasir Sahad 
Sahad was arrested because he was believed to have information about terrorist activities. He was 
captured while harvesting wheat close to an insurgent encampment. Officials later found that, as a 
teenager, Sahad had been an active member of the insurgency until 2008. While he was a member 
of the insurgency he was involved in an attack as a sniper, during which time he shot and killed 
four elementary school children to create a distraction and allow the other insurgents to get into 
position. He cut off contact with this group several years before his recent arrest. Since the time 
of his arrest, Sahad has continued to deny that he has any helpful information about nearby 
terrorist organizations, but he was believed to have overheard something useful. Based on this 
assumption, he was subjected to an “enhanced” interrogation, which involved torture and left him 
with permanent physical and psychological damage. 
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[Filler Scenario 1—Forest Fire] 
Topic of the Story: Forest Fire 
Person Described: Jack Reynolds 
Reynolds was pronounced dead after being transported to the ER from the scene of a serious 
forest fire. Despite the dry conditions, park and wildlife officials decided to begin a controlled 
burn with the intent to avoid an out of control fire later. Those who lived in the area were told that 
the burn was going to take place. Because Reynolds was camping in the woods nearby, he never 
heard about the controlled burn. Within 24 hours, the winds picked up, making the fire burn 
uncontrollably. People living in the area were told to evacuate. Because Reynolds was still 
camping at the time, he did not hear the evacuation alert. He was trapped in the fire while fleeing 
his campsite. He received serious burns in the fire and died shortly after being rescued. 
 
[Filler Scenario 2—Forest Fire] 
Topic of the Story: Forest Fire 
Person Described: Mark Johnson 
Johnson was hospitalized after being caught in an out of control forest fire. Although it had been 
a particularly dry summer, the park and wildlife officials decided to start a controlled burn in 
order to avoid having an out of control forest fire in the future. Nearby residents were notified 
about the controlled burn and were warned that they may need to evacuate if the situation were to 
get out of hand. Johnson had been camping in the woods near his home at the time, and did not 
know about the situation. After only a day, the winds in the area picked up and caused the fire to 
spread uncontrollably. Residents were told to evacuate as soon as possible. Johnson was not 
aware that an evacuation had been ordered and was caught in the fire as he tried to run to safety. 
He sustained severe burns and is currently in critical condition. 
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[Filler Scenario 3—Car Accident] 
Topic of the Story: Car Accident 
Person Described: Jenna West 
An ambulance rushed West to the hospital after she was hit by a semi truck while she was 
standing on the shoulder of the highway. She is currently in critical condition. She stopped her car 
after witnessing an accident and was helping one of the drivers out of a wrecked vehicle when she 
was hit by an oncoming semi truck. The truck did not stop, so police do not know who was 
responsible for the accident. Because of the clear skies that morning it was extremely sunny, so 
the truck driver likely did not see West at all. Also, due to the large size of the truck, the driver 
probably did not realize that he had hit anyone. West is currently in a coma and doctors are 
uncertain about her chances at recovery. 
 
[Filler Scenario 4—Car Accident] 
Topic of the Story: Car Accident 
Person Described: Sarah Smith 
Smith was taken to the emergency room after being hit by a truck while she was on the side of the 
road. Smith had stopped after her car stalled on the highway. She was able to get it onto the 
shoulder and determine that the engine failure was the result of Smith failing to get the oil 
changed last month. She was on her phone with a mechanic discussing repairs when she was 
struck by a semi truck. It had been very sunny that morning and the driver had probably been 
blinded by the sun, so he probably did not even see Smith or realize that he hit her. Police 
currently do not know the identity of the driver who was responsible for the crash. Smith is 
currently unconscious and doctors are unsure about her likelihood of waking up. 
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APPENDIX G: Torture Scenario Response Items 
 
The next few questions are about your reactions to this event. There are no right or wrong 
answers; we are simply interested in people’s individual opinions.    
 
[Section 1: Toleration Items] 
Please answer the next three items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree     Neutral     
Strongly 
Agree 
_____ The methods used in [Farid/Sahad]'s interrogation were appropriate  
_____ The way [Farid/Sahad] was treated during the interrogation was justified  
_____ The use of torture in the interrogation of [Farid/Sahad] was acceptable.  
 
[Section 2: Deservingness Items] 
Please answer the next four items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree     Neutral     
Strongly 
Agree 
_____ [Farid/Sahad] deserved to be treated harshly.  
_____ [Farid/Sahad] deserved to be punished.  
_____ [Farid/Sahad] deserved to be tortured.  
 
[Section 3: Good/Moral Person and Good/Moral Behaviour Items] 
Please answer the next four items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Bad/Immoral     Neutral     
Very 
Good/Moral 
_____ To what extent do you think [Farid/Sahad] is a good or bad person?  
_____ To what extent do you think [Farid/Sahad] is a moral or immoral person?  
_____ To what extent do you think [Farid/Sahad]’s past behaviour was good or bad?  
_____ To what extent do you think [Farid/Sahad]’s past behaviour was moral or immoral?  
 
[Section 4: Likelihood of Having Important Information] 
Please answer the next item using the drop down menu. 
 
On a scale from 0% (no chance) to 100% (definitely), rate how likely you think it is that 
[Farid/Sahad] was withholding information about terrorist activities. 
 
{drop down menu with values from 0%-100% shown here} 
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APPENDIX H: Filler Scenario Response Items 
 
**In keeping with the story that some pages have not been displayed correctly, the response items 
for one of the filler scenarios will be displayed without the last two questions (i.e., those asking 
about supporting the person in the story).** 
 
The next few questions are about your reactions to this case. There are no right or wrong 
answers; we are simply interested in people’s individual opinions.    
 
(Fire Scenarios) 
 
Please answer the next three items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree     Neutral     
Strongly 
Agree 
_____ [Johnson/Reynolds] deserved to be caught in the fire. 
_____ [Johnson/Reynolds] deserved to be hurt.  
_____ [Johnson/Reynolds] did not deserve to be trapped in the fire. 
 
 
Please answer the next four items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Bad/Immoral     Neutral     
Very 
Good/Moral 
_____ To what extent do you think [Johnson/Reynolds] is a good or bad person? 
_____ To what extent do you think [Johnson/Reynolds] is a moral or immoral person? 
_____ To what extent do you think [Johnson/Reynolds]’s behaviour was good or bad? 
_____ To what extent do you think [Johnson/Reynolds]’s behaviour was moral or immoral? 
 
 
The next questions are about your willingness to support [Johnson/Reynolds] in a couple 
different ways. 
 
 
Please answer the next four items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Willing     Neutral     
Completely 
Willing 
_____ It is not uncommon for cases like [Johnson/Reynolds]’s to become the subject of 
negligence lawsuits against park and wildlife officials. If [Johnson/Reynolds]’s case were brought 
to trial, how willing would you be to make a donation to help cover the legal fees? 
 
_____ Cases like [Johnson/Reynolds]’s often catch the attention of various fire safety 
organizations. How willing would you be to write a letter opposing the use of the controlled burn 
that injured [Johnson/Reynolds]? 
 
 
 
 
 
  133 
 
(Car Accident Scenarios) 
 
Please answer the next three items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree   Neutral   
Strongly 
Agree 
_____ [West/Smith] deserved to be hit by a truck. 
_____ [West/Smith] deserved to be hurt. 
_____ [West/Smith] did not deserve to be in a coma. 
 
 
Please answer the next four items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Bad/Immoral   Neutral   
Very 
Good/Moral 
_____ To what extent do you think [West/Smith] is a good or bad person? 
_____ To what extent do you think [West/Smith] is a moral or immoral person? 
_____ To what extent do you think [West/Smith]’s behaviour was good or bad? 
_____ To what extent do you think [West/Smith]’s behaviour was moral or immoral? 
 
 
The next questions are about your willingness to support [West/Smith] in a couple different ways. 
 
 
Please answer the next four items using the scale below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Willing     Neutral     
Completely 
Willing 
_____ It is not uncommon for cases like [West/Smith]’s to become the subject of lawsuits. If 
[West/Smith]’s case were brought to trial, how willing would you be to make a donation to help 
cover the legal fees? 
 
_____ Cases like [West/Smith]’s often catch the attention of various traffic safety organizations. 
How willing would you be to write a letter supporting the creation of new driving laws that would 
help prevent accidents like the one that put [West/Smith] in a coma? 
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APPENDIX I: Attention Check/Discrepancy Score Item 
 
 
The following question will be used to determine how closely you are paying attention.  
 
Which of the following values is the highest? If more than one value is tied for the highest, pick 
the first of these values that appears in the list. 
 
(1) {Discrepancy score for torture with minor transgression scenario} 
(2) {Discrepancy score for torture with serious transgression scenario} 
(3) {Discrepancy score for torture with minor transgression scenario-1} 
(4) {Discrepancy score for torture with serious transgression scenario-1} 
 
*Participants had to choose option (1) or (2) to continue. If participants did not select options 1 or 
2, the survey registered that they made an error and asked them to try again—the way the 
question was set up, the highest value was always option 1 and/or 2. 
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APPENDIX J: Support for Human Rights Writing Task 
 
We are interested in how people think about human rights and why they are motivated to 
support universal human rights. For this task, you are being asked to write a persuasive essay 
about why you believe it is important to support human rights. Excerpts from your essay might 
be featured in promotional materials being dispersed on campus to promote support for human 
rights and to inform people why universal human rights are important. 
Universal human rights are rights that are granted to everyone (e.g., regardless of race, gender, 
behaviour, sexual orientation, and so on) and are described in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948). This document claims that every person has the 
right to such things as access to adequate medical care, participation in the political process, and 
humane treatment.  In order to better understand what motivates people to support universal 
human rights, we would like you to write a short essay (about one paragraph) about how people 
benefit from human rights.  There are several different rights about which we are asking people to 
write.  The one that has been assigned to you is displayed below. 
Human Right Description: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” 
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APPENDIX K: Hypocrisy Condition Information 
 
To get a better understanding of how people think about human rights, we have an additional 
question about your thoughts and opinions related to human rights. 
In order to better understand why people might not support universal human rights, we would like 
you to write a short essay (about one paragraph) about a situation in which you might feel 
conflicted about supporting a human right. You will be writing about the same human right as in 
Part 1. In order to help you think of an example of when you might feel conflicted about 
supporting this right, we have chosen one of the scenarios related to human rights from the 
previous study for you to use to come up with ideas. The scenario and your responses are 
displayed below. 
Human Right Description: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” 
 
{Scenario and associated responses were shown here.} 
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APPENDIX L: Affect Measure 
 
Please rate the extent to which these terms describe your current state after writing the human 
rights persuasive essays. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Does Not 
Apply at 
All 
  Neutral   Applies 
Very Much 
 
[Negative Emotions about the Self] 
______ Angry at myself 
______ Guilty 
______ Annoyed with myself 
______ Disgusted with myself 
______ Regretful 
______ Shameful 
______ Self-critical 
[Negative Emotions about Other] 
______ Angry at others 
______ Irritated at others 
______ Disgusted with others 
[Discomfort] 
______ Fearful 
______ Uneasy 
______ Embarrassed 
______ Bothered 
______ Tense 
______ Threatened 
______ Uncomfortable 
[Positive Emotions] 
______ Friendly 
______ Happy 
______ Energetic 
______ Optimistic 
______ Content 
______ Good 
[Depressed] 
______ Low 
______ Depressed 
______ Sad 
______ Helpless 
______ Anxious 
______ Frustrated 
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APPENDIX M: Error Message 
 
[After clicking “Submit” the participant will be taken to the following screen for 5 seconds.] 
 
 
[After 5 seconds, the survey will move to the next page and show the following alert.] 
 
 
[The participant will click “OK” and then they will see the following message.] 
 
Your response has been received and will be recorded. 
Please wait while we finish processing your response. 
Click here if you are not automatically redirected. 
******ERROR 500****** 
Internal Server Error 
Several pages of this survey have not been displayed correctly! 
Some of the questions, images or text were not loaded. 
OK 
ERROR 500 - Internal Server Error 
Four pages of this survey have not been displayed correctly. 
Please contact the researcher for assistance. 
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APPENDIX N: Behavioural Intention Items 
 
 (For torture scenarios) 
 
The next two questions are about your willingness to support [Farid/Sahad] against the people 
who interrogated him. Please answer the next items using the scale below. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at All 
Willing  
  Neutral   Completely 
Willing 
 
______ It is not uncommon for interrogations like [Farid/Sahad]’s to become the subject of 
lawsuits claiming that those who were interrogated were treated inhumanely. If 
[Farid/Sahad]’s case were brought to trial, how willing would you be to make a donation 
to help cover his legal fees? 
 
______ Cases like [Farid/Sahad]’s often catch the attention of various anti-violence 
organizations. How willing would you be to write a letter opposing the treatment 
[Farid/Sahad] received during his interrogation? 
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APPENDIX O: Verbal Protocol for Debriefing 
 
 I want to explain the work we’re doing in a little more detail before you go today. Do you 
have anything you would like to ask before I start? {Record questions on the debriefing notes 
sheet} 
 
 I have a couple of questions for you that will help us assess if the procedures need to be 
changed in future studies. During any of the research you participated in today, was there 
anything unclear about the instructions or any of the procedures? Did anything seem odd or 
strange about the instructions or any other part of the research? Can you explain in your own 
words what you think this study is about? {Make notes on answers; tell them they are on the right 
track if they answer the last question} 
 
 Now I’m going to tell you about the purpose of the research in more detail. 
 
 As you know, in Study 1 we are interested in people’s reactions to news stories. More 
specifically, we are interested in how people respond to scenarios about human rights violations. 
Two of the scenarios you read for Study 1 described a violation of the right to protection against 
torture (that is, the right to humane treatment). In these scenarios, the past behaviour of the man 
was different; one scenario was about a man who had caused minor harm to soldiers and the other 
scenario was about a man who had caused serious harm to children. We predicted that 
participants would be more willing to tolerate the rights violation when the man had caused 
serious harm. We think that this is because people will feel that the man in this case deserves 
treatment that violates his rights. So, in general, we think that people will tolerate a violation of 
human rights if they think the person deserves such treatment. We also predicted that some 
participants would tolerate the rights violation when the man caused serious harm to children, 
even if they support human rights overall; that is, we predicted that some people would be 
inconsistent in their support for human rights. This is why we asked you a few questions in the 
beginning of Study 1 about your general support for human rights. 
 
 I need to tell you that all of the scenarios for Study 1 were fictional, although some of the 
events they depicted were taken from actual news stories. We want people to believe the stories 
are actual events so that their responses are more realistic. 
 
 Study 2, as you know, was about writing persuasive essays. Specifically, we are 
interested in how the writing task affects people’s reactions to the kind of human rights violation 
you read about in Study 1. This is how the study works. There are two versions of the writing 
task, and you were given one of these. One version asked participants to write about a time when 
they might feel conflicted about supporting human rights. Participants wrote about this conflict 
while looking at the particular scenario from Study 1 where they showed the most inconsistency. 
By inconsistency, I mean when a participant says they support human rights generally, but then 
agree with the inhumane way the man is treated in the scenario. Usually, this happens with the 
scenario where the man caused serious harm to children, because this is where people tend to 
tolerate the man’s torture, even when they support human rights in general. The second version of 
the writing task asked participants to write an essay about the right to humane treatment, but did 
not connect the right with their responses to the scenarios in Study 1. 
We predicted that many participants who do the first version of the writing task will see an 
inconsistency between their general support for human rights and their toleration of the human 
rights violation—this should not be the case for participants who do the second version of the 
writing task. We also predicted that participants who see an inconsistency will reduce their 
toleration of human rights violations so that they are more consistent with their overall support 
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for human rights. We tested this prediction in a couple of ways. You were asked to complete a 
portion of the first study for a second time. Those who felt they behaved inconsistently with 
respect to human rights should tolerate the violation less this second time compared to when they 
had first read and responded to the scenarios. You probably remember the error screen that asked 
you to complete part of the first study again. We deliberately put up the error screen as an excuse 
to get participants to fill out these questions again. We do not want participants to know we are 
interested in how their responses might change from Study 1 to Study 2; if they knew, it might 
affect how they answer the questions. 
 
 Also, before coming out into the hall, you were given a slip of paper on which you could 
write your email if you wanted more information on supporting human rights. We predicted that 
those who felt that they behaved inconsistently would be more likely to ask for information than 
those who did not feel they were inconsistent. We tear up everyone’s email address at the end of 
the day and, instead, everyone gets information for several human rights organizations on the 
printed debriefing form. Your email will be in no way associated with any of your data in this 
study—all of your responses are anonymous, like it said in the consent form. 
One last point about the procedure for Study 2 I have to explain. You were told that your 
responses might be used in promotional materials on campus. However, I want you to understand 
that your responses will not, in any way, be used outside of analysing the results of this study. 
Your responses will remain confidential and will not be shared with anyone. The reason we tell 
participants that their responses might be used in promotional materials is that past research has 
shown that people who have been inconsistent in how they respond to some issue are more 
bothered by that inconsistency if they think they will have to publicly state what they believe, 
rather than just saying what they believe to themselves. 
 
 Remember that there are no right or wrong ways to respond to anything in the studies you 
took part in today. Everyone has their own beliefs about things, and those beliefs should be 
respected. 
 
Do you have any questions about anything I have told you so far? 
 
 Now I want to explain why we didn’t tell you everything about the purpose and the 
procedure of the research until the study was over. If people know everything about the research 
before they come in here, they may respond according to what they think we are looking for – 
either unconsciously or just to be helpful and cooperative. Then we wouldn’t know if the 
responses we are getting are people’s true and honest reactions or not. We would prefer not to 
hide anything about the research, but we also have to make sure that we are getting spontaneous 
and realistic responses from people. Does that make sense to you? 
 
 You’ve been very helpful. Thank you for all of your suggestions and for your honesty. I 
have to ask a favour of you before we wrap things up. It’s very important that you don’t discuss 
this study or anything I told you with anyone else. If people know what is expected of them 
before they come in here, their reactions in the study may be influenced in some way, and the 
data that we are collecting would be useless. I can’t emphasize enough how important it is that 
people come into the study not knowing exactly what we are trying to do. With that in mind, it 
would be very helpful to me if you can let me know what, if anything, you heard about this study 
before you came here today. I don’t care where or from whom you heard anything, just what you 
may have heard. {Take notes}. If anyone asks you about the study, you can just tell them what is 
in the SONA advertisement -- that they have to fill out questionnaires and do a computer task. 
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 Okay, the last thing I’m going to give you is a written explanation of the study, as I’ve 
already explained it to you. Also on the handout is contact information for the Research Ethics 
Officer at Brock, if you have any questions about your rights as a study participant. Cari Drolet is 
conducting this study for her Master’s thesis and Dr. Hafer in the Department of Psychology is 
supervising this research. If you have any questions about the research we are doing that you 
think of later, you can contact Dr. Hafer or Cari Drolet using the information on this handout. The 
results of this research will be available approximately one year from now. You can contact Cari 
Drolet or Dr. Hafer, or see our lab’s Facebook page if you are interested in the results. Do you 
have any more questions? I hope you found this study interesting. Thank you for your 
cooperation! 
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APPENDIX P: Consent Following Debriefing 
Fill out this section if you AGREE to have you data analysed for this study. 
 
I agree to have my data included in this study. I have made this decision based on the 
information that was presented during the Verbal Debriefing. I have the opportunity to 
receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or the 
Brock University Research Ethics Office. Sign below if you agree to have your data 
included in the study. 
 
 
Name (printed) Signature Date 
 
 
 
Fill out this section if you DO NOT AGREE to have you data analysed for this study. 
 
I do not agree to have my data included in this study. I have made this decision based on 
the information that was presented during the Verbal Debriefing. I have the opportunity to 
receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or the 
Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that my data cannot be recovered 
once it has been removed. Sign below if you agree to have your data permanently removed 
from the study. 
 
 
Name (printed) Signature Date 
 
Participant ID: __________________________________ 
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APPENDIX Q: Printed Debriefing Form 
Project Title: Opinions on Social Issues Questionnaire 
 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Carolyn Hafer, Professor of Social Psychology  
Department of Psychology  
Brock University  
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 4297; chafer@brocku.ca 
 
Student Principal Investigator: Caroline Drolet, MA candidate  
Department of Psychology  
Brock University  
cd11da@brocku.ca 
Research Feedback 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you very much for participating in this study. The general purpose of this research is to 
examine whether people are willing to tolerate human right violations in specific situations based 
on deservingness judgments, despite expressing support for human rights more generally. There 
are many reasons why people might tolerate human rights violations. For example, if there were a 
utilitarian reason to use inhumane treatment (e.g., torturing an alleged terrorist to get information 
about a potential attack) then people may be willing to overlook the violation on the grounds that 
it was justified. Additionally, the perceived deservingness of the person whose rights are violated 
may influence the degree to which the human rights violation is tolerated. If a person were to 
have committed some horrible transgression, the rights violation might be tolerated because the 
person was seen as immoral and deserving of harsh treatment. 
This research session involved two related studies. Study 1 involved answering some questions 
about your personal opinions, then reading and responding to scenarios that depicted stories like 
those you would see in the news. Amongst the opinion questions were four items assessing your 
support for human rights—one asked about human rights in general and the other asked about 
your support for the protection against torture (i.e., the right to humane treatment). Two of the 
scenarios you read also dealt with human rights. Specifically, the scenarios involved a violation 
of the right to humane treatment. In these two scenarios, the past behaviour of the main character 
was manipulated; one scenario was about a character who had caused minor harm (injured 
soldiers) and the other scenario was about a character who had caused serious harm (killed 
children). We expected that participants would be more willing to tolerate the rights violation 
when the character had caused serious harm compared to minor harm. We also expected that 
some people would tolerate the rights violation when the character caused serious harm to 
children, even if they support human rights overall; that is, we predicted that some people would 
be inconsistent in their support for human rights.  
In Study 2, you were asked to write about supporting human rights. Then, you were either asked 
to write about supporting a specific right or about a situation in which you might have felt 
conflicted about supporting human rights. Those who wrote about a time when they might feel 
conflicted about supporting human rights were shown a scenario from Study 1 that was expected 
to help them recognize that they had been inconsistent between their support for human rights and 
their toleration of the human rights violation in the scenario (if, in fact, they had been 
inconsistent). Again the second writing task simply asked participants to write about supporting a 
particular right, so these participants should not focus on any inconsistency they might have 
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shown in their support for human rights. After the writing portion of the study, you were asked to 
fill out some general questions about your emotions and how you were feeling. If many people 
who did the first writing task were actually recognizing their inconsistency, then they should 
express more discomfort compared to people who did the second writing task (who were not 
made to think about inconsistencies). Additionally, you were asked to complete a portion of 
Study 1 a second time. Those who felt they behaved inconsistently with respect to human rights 
should tolerate the violation less this second time compared to when they had first read and 
responded to the scenarios. Before leaving, you were given the opportunity to write down your 
email in order to get more information on human rights. We expected that those who felt they 
behaved inconsistently with respect to human rights would be more likely to ask for information 
than other participants. If you are interested in getting more information on human rights, we 
have provided information on human rights organizations at the end of this form. 
Now that we have more fully explained this research to you, we must ask you to please avoid 
telling anyone else about the details of this study and its purpose. Doing so may alter the results 
because people might respond differently if they know what we are looking for. This is why we 
did not tell you everything about this research until after you had completed this study. 
If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
the Brock University Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. If you 
have any other questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the investigators. Results will be 
available after November, 2013. If you wish to learn about the results of our research at that time, 
contact one of the investigators or see our Facebook page (Social Justice Lab – Brock 
University). We will only provide group averages and overall results, not personal information, 
because all data will remain anonymous and confidential. 
Thank you again for your participation! 
For more information on human rights and their violation, see the following Human Rights 
Organizations: 
 
• Amnesty International—campaign to end abuses of universal human rights 
website: http://www.amnesty.org/ 
• Global Rights—works on building grass roots movements to promote and protect the rights 
of marginalized populations, as well as documenting human rights abuses 
website: http://www.globalrights.org 
• Human Rights Watch—devoted to defending and protecting human rights 
website: http://www.hrw.org 
• UN Watch—monitors the performance of the UN according to its own charter 
website: http://www.unwatch.org 
